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DEFENDING EXECUTIVE NONDEFENSE AND THE 
PRINCIPAL–AGENT PROBLEM 
Brianne J. Gorod 
ABSTRACT—Critics of the Obama Administration’s decision not to defend 
the Defense of Marriage Act argued that the President had a “duty to 
defend” the law and that the Executive Branch should serve as Congress’s 
agent in defending statutes in court. Both propositions are wrong. First, it 
does not make sense to think of the Executive Branch as Congress’s agent 
because, in the context of government action, there are multiple and 
changing principals and the Executive Branch is at once both principal and 
agent. Second, the President does not have an absolute duty to defend 
statutes in court. Proponents of the duty to defend argue that defense of the 
law is part of the President’s constitutional obligation to take care that the 
laws are faithfully executed and that it is untoward for the government to 
speak with more than one voice in court. This Article argues that defense is 
distinct from execution, and that in some contexts, it is helpful for the 
government to speak with more than one voice. The Article then argues that 
where the Executive Branch has questions about a statute’s 
constitutionality, it should not defend the law because nondefense better 
serves our adversarial system of justice and better enables the Executive 
Branch to protect its own interests. Moreover, where the Executive Branch 
does not defend, Congress or court-appointed counsel can do so in its place. 
Finally, this Article suggests that recognizing that classic principal–agent 
principles do not apply to executive branch action may have implications 
for other contexts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Every day in different forums and contexts around the world, 
individuals and entities act on behalf of the “United States.” Generally, such 
actions are uncontroversial and should be so—these individuals and entities 
are faithfully acting on behalf of the “United States” to execute the nation’s 
laws and policies. It is natural to think of these executive branch 
representatives as simple agents, implementing law and policy developed 
by a distinct principal. But the Executive Branch is no simple agent,1 and, 
even if it were, there is generally no distinct principal capable of providing 
sustained control over its actions.2 In other words, classic principal–agent 
principles do not work well in the context of executive branch action. That 
fact may have important implications for how we think about executive 
branch action in many contexts,3 but this Article focuses on one such 
 
1  See infra notes 137‒43 and accompanying text. Although the Executive Branch is often 
responsible for acting on behalf of the “United States” as a whole, it also must exercise its own 
constitutional obligations. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (providing that the President “shall take Care that 
the Laws be faithfully executed”). 
2  See infra notes 123‒33 and accompanying text. 
3  See infra Part V. 
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context—the Executive Branch’s so-called “duty to defend” challenged 
statutes. 
By statute, “the conduct of litigation in which the United States, an 
agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested” is, with certain 
limitations, “reserved to officers of the Department of Justice,”4 and United 
States attorneys are directed to “prosecute for all offenses against the 
United States; [and] prosecute or defend, for the Government, all civil 
actions, suits or proceedings in which the United States is concerned” that 
arise in their districts.5 These statutes are commonly understood to confer 
upon the Department of Justice (DOJ or Department) and other federal 
lawyers the responsibility to serve as the United States’ agents in court. 
Generally, such assumptions of simple agency are, even if incomplete, also 
unproblematic; there is generally little controversy about the actions the 
DOJ takes (or fails to take) in the name of the “United States.” But 
sometimes there is. 
Earlier this year, the DOJ announced that it would no longer defend the 
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA),6 which defines the word “marriage” for 
purposes of federal law to mean “only a legal union between one man and 
one woman as husband and wife.”7 The Department explained that the 
President had concluded that the statute was unconstitutional and thus, 
despite the “longstanding practice of defending the constitutionality of 
duly-enacted statutes if reasonable arguments can be made in their 
defense,” this was the “rare case” in which defense was not appropriate.8 
Although gay rights proponents celebrated the decision, many others 
condemned the Obama Administration. These critics of the Administration 
made two related arguments. First, they argued that the President has a duty 
to defend challenged statutes in court and that President Obama abdicated 
 
4  28 U.S.C. § 516 (2006). 
5  Id. § 547(1)‒(2). 
6  Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006), 28 U.S.C. § 1738C). 
7  1 U.S.C. § 7. 
8  Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of 
Representatives 5 (Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-
223.html. Prior to that announcement, the Obama Administration had been defending DOMA in court 
and had been criticized for doing so. See, e.g., Paul Hogarth, Obama’s DOMA Defense Unacceptable, 
HUFFINGTON POST (June 15, 2009, 12:49 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paul-hogarth/obamas-
doma-defense-unacc_b_215718.html (criticizing the Administration for “advanc[ing] legal arguments 
that—if pursued by the courts—could greatly damage gay and lesbian rights”). Earlier in the 
Administration, the President and his advisers also confronted the question whether to defend in court 
the ban on openly gay men and women serving in the military. See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2006). In that case, 
“the Obama administration’s Justice Department . . . continued with appeals, saying [it was] bound by a 
‘duty to defend’ the laws even if it [did not] like them.” Devin Dwyer, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”: Is 
Obama Administration Bound to Defend Law It Opposes?, ABC NEWS (Oct. 21, 2010), http://
abcnews.go.com/Politics/dont-debate-obama-administrations-legal-defense-gay-ban/story?id=11928405. 
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this responsibility when he abandoned DOMA’s defense.9 According to 
these critics, the President’s decision laid the groundwork for subsequent 
presidents to abandon the legal defense of statutes with which they disagree 
as a matter of policy. For example, one prominent law professor who 
opposes DOMA nonetheless criticized the Administration for declining to 
defend it, arguing that the Administration’s decision “sets a terrible 
precedent that could well come back to haunt those who are cheering the 
president’s decision.”10 Second, they argued that the Executive Branch was 
ignoring its proper role vis-à-vis Congress. Specifically, they argued that 
the Executive Branch’s proper role in defending legislation is that of 
Congress’s agent, and that the only way it could be a faithful agent was to 
defend the legislation. One commentator, for example, argued that the 
Administration’s decision “changes the role of the Executive branch in 
defending litigation from the traditional dutiful servant of Congress to 
major institutional player with a great deal of discretion.”11 
Neither of these criticisms is persuasive. First, although commentators 
have long invoked the idea that the Executive Branch has a duty to defend 
challenged statutes, no one has ever meaningfully explained precisely what 
that duty is or where it comes from. There may be a reason for this. 
 
9  See, e.g., Newt Gingrich Discusses Potential Obama Impeachment, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 25, 
2011, 6:42 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/25/newt-gingrich-obama-impeachment-
palin_n_828506.html (“House Republicans . . . should pass a resolution instructing the president to 
enforce the law and to obey his own constitutional oath, and they should say if he fails to do so that they 
will zero out [defund] the office of attorney general and take other steps as necessary until the president 
agrees to do his job.” (alteration in original) (quoting former Speaker of the House and Republican 
presidential candidate Newt Gingrich)). 
10  Adam Winkler, Why Obama Is Wrong on DOMA, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 24, 2011, 12:01 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/adam-winkler/why-obama-is-wrong-on-dom_b_827676.html (“Don’t be 
surprised if a President Palin points to Obama’s decision when announcing her refusal to enforce and 
defend the landmark healthcare reform law because, in her view, the individual mandate is 
unconstitutional.”). Although I focus in this Article on the federal government, this issue arises at the 
state level as well. Most recently, the litigation surrounding Proposition 8, the California ballot initiative 
that overturned an earlier California Supreme Court decision recognizing a right to same-sex marriage 
under the California Constitution, gave rise to the same questions about the Executive Branch’s 
responsibility to defend the constitutionality of challenged statutes. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 
384, 401 (Cal. 2008). In that case, then-Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and then-Attorney General 
Edmund Gerald Brown decided not to defend the Proposition and, like President Obama, were subject to 
both praise and criticism for their decision. See generally Vikram David Amar, Lessons from 
California’s Recent Experience with Its Non-Unitary (Divided) Executive: Of Mayors, Governors, 
Controllers, and Attorneys General, 59 EMORY L.J. 469 (2009) (discussing Attorney General Brown’s 
decision not to defend Proposition 8 and asking whether there are lessons in that decision for the federal 
government). And in Wisconsin, Governor Scott Walker told the courts that he could no longer defend 
the state’s domestic partner registry because he believed it was unconstitutional. See Todd Richmond, 
Walker: Domestic Partner Law Is Unconstitutional, WIS. L.J. (May 16, 2011, 9:14 PM), http://
wislawjournal.com/2011/05/16/walker-domestic-partner-law-is-unconstitutional/. 
11  Orin Kerr, The Executive Power Grab in the Decision Not to Defend DOMA, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Feb. 23, 2011, 3:49 PM), http://volokh.com/2011/02/23/the-executive-power-grab-in-the-
decision-not-to-defend-doma/. 
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Although it is almost certainly prudent for the DOJ to generally defend 
challenged statutes, it is not at all clear that it has a duty to do so in all 
circumstances, and the principal justifications for such a duty do not 
support its existence. Some commentators have assumed that because the 
Executive Branch is responsible for enforcing the law,12 it must be 
responsible for defending it as well.13 But as I argue below, there are 
meaningful differences between enforcement and defense, and a duty to do 
the former does not necessarily imply a duty to do the latter. There also 
seems to be a deep-seated belief that the United States should speak with 
“one voice” in court. Chief Justice Roberts recently gave vivid expression 
to this belief, explaining that the “difference between a suit against the State 
brought by a private party and one brought by a state agency . . . is the 
difference between eating and cannibalism; between murder and 
patricide.”14 But it is unclear why this should be. When different parts of the 
government have competing views—as they inevitably will—there is no 
reason why the DOJ should have the exclusive authority to determine what 
the government’s position will be in court. Rather, it makes sense to allow 
different parts of the government to present their views and to let the courts, 
which are supposed to be the final arbiters of the constitutionality of federal 
statutes, determine which is right.15 
Second, the Executive Branch cannot be—and should not be—simply 
Congress’s dutiful agent. Indeed, there are meaningful limits to what simple 
principal–agent principles can teach us when applied to executive branch 
 
12  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (“[A]n 
agency’s refusal to institute proceedings shares to some extent the characteristics of the decision of a 
prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indict—a decision which has long been regarded as the special 
province of the Executive Branch, inasmuch as it is the Executive who is charged by the Constitution to 
‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3)). See generally 
James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1523 (1981) 
(examining “the nature, scope, and effects of prosecutorial power” and arguing against “its present 
expanded form”). 
13  See infra Part II.C. 
14  Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1649 (2011) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting). 
15  See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (“[Marbury v. Madison] declared the basic 
principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that 
principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable 
feature of our constitutional system.”); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”); see also City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997) (reaffirming the “judicial authority to determine the 
constitutionality of laws, in cases and controversies”). To be sure, there is substantial debate within the 
academic community about whether the judiciary should play this role, see infra note 162, but 
“[j]udicial supremacy has been, to an increasing degree over time, the practice for the better part of the 
two centuries since Marbury,” Dale Carpenter, Judicial Supremacy and Its Discontents, 20 CONST. 
COMMENT. 405, 422 (2003). I therefore take as my starting point the assumption that the courts are the 
final expositors of constitutional meaning. But this position nonetheless allows for the Executive Branch 
to develop and advance—within limits—its own interpretation of the Constitution. 
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action. Recognizing these limits may have broad implications for how we 
think about executive branch action in many contexts, but it also offers 
specific lessons about the role of the Executive Branch in defending 
challenged statutes. First, in the context of executive branch action, the 
absence of a single principal and the existence of intertemporal 
complications mean that there will often be situations in which there is no 
principal capable of exercising sustained control over the agent’s actions. In 
other words, the Congress and the President that enacted a law at t1 may not 
be around to direct its execution (or provide checks against its mis-
execution) at t2.16 In the duty-to-defend context, these lessons remind us that 
we cannot necessarily assume that the current Executive Branch and 
Congress will be inclined to defend a law enacted by a previous Executive 
Branch and Congress.17 Second, the Executive Branch is at once both 
principal and agent. The Executive Branch plays a role in the enactment of 
legislation through the presentment process, and its various agencies are 
generally supposed to make substantive policy through the broad 
delegations of power they are granted. The Executive Branch is thus 
supposed to have its own institutional views and interests, at least in some 
cases. Recognizing these facts helps make clear that the Executive Branch 
is not simply Congress’s agent, and it should not defend challenged statutes 
for that reason. 
This does not mean that the Executive Branch should never defend 
challenged statutes or even that it should rarely do so. My point is only that 
it need not always do so and that we should think critically about the 
circumstances in which executive nondefense is preferable to executive 
defense. In the remainder of this Article, I argue that the Obama 
Administration was correct not to defend DOMA because the Executive 
Branch should not defend challenged statutes when it believes that the 
statute is unconstitutional, or even has questions about the statute’s 
constitutionality. By Executive Branch, I mean the President or DOJ 
attorneys in cases in which the President is not personally involved. 
Although there are many interesting questions about the internal dynamics 
 
16  See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. 
L. REV. 2312, 2359 (2006) (“[I]f there is a problem with sweeping delegations, it would seem to be 
primarily a matter of time inconsistency. Patterns of party control change periodically, but many broad 
delegations passed under unified government stay in effect indefinitely, until the statutes are revised or 
repealed.”). 
17  It seems certain, for example, that a Democrat-controlled House would have declined to defend 
DOMA. See, e.g., Felicia Sonmez & Ben Pershing, Boehner Moves to Defend Gay-Marriage Ban, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2011, at A2 (quoting House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi as saying, “I oppose 
Speaker Boehner’s effort to put the House in the position of defending this indefensible statute.”). 
Indeed, when the House Bipartisan Legal Advisory Committee voted to defend the statute, the measure 
passed by a 3–2 party-line vote. See Letter from Rep. Nancy Pelosi, Democratic House Leader, to Rep. 
John Boehner, Speaker of the House, U.S. House of Representatives (Mar. 11, 2011), available at http://
pelosi.house.gov/news/press-releases/2011/03/pelosi-letter-to-speaker-boehner-on-house-counsel-
defense-of-doma.shtml. 
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by which the Executive Branch determines its legal views on questions,18 I 
here assume that the Executive Branch has a settled view that is consistent 
with the views of the President and his political appointees.19 
My position will, of course, seem unexceptionable to those who 
believe that the Executive Branch is an equal and independent interpreter of 
the Constitution, free to act on its own views of the Constitution, whatever 
the courts might have to say.20 If the Executive Branch need not enforce 
statutes that it believes are unconstitutional, it certainly need not defend 
them. But one need not agree that the Executive Branch is free to disregard 
the dictates of the courts to think that it can—and should—sometimes 
decline to defend the constitutionality of challenged statutes in court. 
Indeed, I start from the premise that the courts are the final arbiters of 
constitutional questions,21 and I argue that executive nondefense may 
actually facilitate, rather than undermine, judicial resolution of disputes. 
After all, where the Executive Branch has questions about a statute’s 
constitutionality, entrusting it to be the United States’ agent in court may 
undermine the purposes normally served by our adversarial system of 
justice. Whatever the imperfections of that system,22 our commitment to 
adversarialism reflects a long-held belief that competing parties will 
facilitate the courts’ search for truth and their ability to reach the best legal 
outcome, and our system’s commitment to adversarialism means that it 
relies in substantial part on adversarial parties. If the purported proponent of 
the statute does not actually believe that it is constitutional and is unwilling 
 
18  There are, for example, interesting questions about the internal processes by which conflicts 
within the Executive Branch are resolved and what role the President should or must play in those 
conflicts. There are also interesting questions about whether the DOJ should consider anew the 
constitutionality of every statute it is called upon to defend or whether it should instead confer a 
presumption of constitutionality on validly enacted legislation. If the latter, the question then becomes 
how it should determine which statutes are selected for special review and what role, if any, the 
President should or must play in that process. These are questions that I hope to take up in the future. 
19  Cf., e.g., Daniel B. Rodriguez, Management, Control, and the Dilemmas of Presidential 
Leadership in the Modern Administrative State, 43 DUKE L.J. 1180, 1194‒95 (1994) (“[T]he President 
sits atop the regulatory system as the leader of the federal bureaucracy. If anyone is positioned to 
coordinate diffuse regulatory policy, it is the President, as leader of the executive branch.”); George F. 
Fraley, III, Note, Is the Fox Watching the Henhouse?: The Administration’s Control of FEC Litigation 
Through the Solicitor General, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1215, 1233 (1996) (“The Solicitor General is 
appointed by the President who is likely to select a candidate with similar political and philosophical 
views.”). 
20  See infra note 162 and accompanying text. Indeed, relying in part on this view, Neal Devins and 
Saikrishna Prakash have recently argued that the executive branch has no duty either to defend or 
enforce challenged laws. See Neal Devins & Saikrishna Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to Defend, 
112 COLUM. L. REV. 507, 509 (2012). 
21  See infra notes 162‒66 and accompanying text. 
22  See, e.g., Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DUKE L.J. 447 (2009); Brianne J. Gorod, 
The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61 DUKE L.J. 1 (2011); Brian P. 
Goldman, Note, Should the Supreme Court Stop Inviting Amici Curiae to Defend Abandoned Lower 
Court Decisions?, 63 STAN. L. REV. 907 (2011). 
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to make the strongest arguments in support of its constitutionality, it 
undermines that system and the benefits it is supposed to promote. 
To be sure, attorneys often offer zealous arguments in support of 
positions with which they disagree. But the DOJ is not the same as private 
counsel, hired solely to promote the interests of a client. As noted above, 
the Executive Branch will often have its own legal views, and it should be 
able to present those views in court to ensure the courts have the benefit of 
the Executive Branch’s most considered legal views, to ensure the public 
knows what the Executive Branch’s views are, and to preserve the 
Executive Branch’s institutional relationship with the courts. 
In the absence of executive defense, a statute need not—and should 
not—go undefended; it should be defended either by Congress or by outside 
counsel appointed by the courts. After all, the United States still has an 
interest in seeing its law defended. The point is simply that the Executive 
Branch need not be the one defending it. 
Recognizing that there will sometimes be complications in asking the 
Executive Branch to act as agent for the whole also suggests a need to give 
more sustained thought to other contexts in which complications may arise 
because the Executive Branch—one component part of the United States—
is supposed to act as agent for the whole. The “United States” is, after all, 
many different things in different contexts: it is the Executive Branch; it is 
the Congress; it is the Judiciary; it is “We the People.” It is even 
governments that have acted in the past. In different contexts, these 
component parts—alone or in combination—operate to determine what the 
law and policy of the “United States” should be. And although it necessarily 
falls to some subset of those parts to act on behalf of the whole, too little 
attention has been paid to the problems that this reality can present, 
including the danger that the Executive Branch may arrogate power to itself 
by purporting to act on behalf of the whole even when it has no authority to 
do so. The specific questions raised by executive branch action (or inaction) 
will vary across contexts, but a general lesson of the duty-to-defend 
question—that simple principal–agent principles do not apply neatly to 
executive branch action—may have larger lessons that extend beyond the 
duty to defend. 
In Part I, I provide some background on the Executive Branch’s role in 
litigating for the United States in general and in defending challenged 
statutes in particular. I then consider the first of the criticisms leveled 
against the Obama Administration—the idea that the Executive Branch has 
a duty to defend challenged statutes. I discuss the two most traditional 
justifications for that duty and explain why, in my view, neither establishes 
that the Executive Branch has an absolute duty to defend challenged 
statutes in all circumstances. 
In Part II, I turn to the other criticism leveled against the Obama 
Administration—that the Executive Branch should act as simple agent for 
Congress in the context of defending statutes in court. I begin by describing 
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the classic principal–agent relationship and then identify two reasons why 
classic principal–agent principles do not work when applied to executive 
branch action: (1) the existence of many and changing principals and (2) the 
fact that the purported agent is both agent and principal. I then apply those 
lessons to the duty-to-defend context. 
Having concluded that the Executive Branch should not always defend 
challenged statutes, I turn in Part III to the question of whether it ought to 
do so when it has questions about the statute’s constitutionality. I argue that 
it should not defend in such a circumstance because doing so threatens to 
undermine our adversarial system and compromises the Executive Branch’s 
ability to protect its own institutional interests. In Part IV, I suggest 
alternative approaches to the executive defense of challenged statutes and 
consider some objections to these alternatives. Most significantly, I 
consider the danger that the United States’ laws will be left undefended. As 
I explain, my approach does not give rise to that concern, but ameliorates it 
by inviting more parties to take up the defense of challenged statutes when 
the Executive Branch may not be in the best position to do so. 
In Part V, I look beyond the duty to defend to the larger lessons that 
controversy can teach us, particularly once we recognize the complications 
inherent in applying classic principal–agent principles to executive branch 
action. Specifically, we need to pay more attention to the complications that 
can arise when a part of the United States is supposed to act as agent for the 
much more complicated whole. Recognizing that fact does not tell us how 
to address the potential conflicts that may arise in different contexts, but it 
does at least ensure that we are asking the right questions. 
I. THE “DUTY TO DEFEND” 
The Executive Branch and, more specifically, the DOJ, have long been 
charged with acting for the United States in the defense of challenged 
statutes, just as they generally act for the United States in most litigation. 
Traditionally, the Executive Branch has declined to defend the 
constitutionality of statutes in only very limited circumstances: where the 
President concluded that the statute was unconstitutional,23 where it was 
clearly unconstitutional under existing Supreme Court precedent,24 or where 
“the statute . . . infringe[d] on the constitutional power of the Executive.”25 
The Executive Branch has also maintained that “a President may decline to 
defend a statute where no ‘respectable’ [or ‘reasonable’] argument can be 
 
23  See, e.g., Chrysanthe Gussis, Note, The Constitution, the White House, and the Military HIV Ban: 
A New Threshold for Presidential Non-Defense of Statutes, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 591, 607 (1997). 
24  See, e.g., id. at 608 (discussing President Kennedy’s decision not to defend “a separate-but-equal 
provision of a law that provided federal funding for racially segregated hospitals”). 
25  The Attorney General’s Duty to Defend the Constitutionality of Statutes, 43 Op. Att’y Gen. 325, 
325 (1981). 
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advanced in its support.”26 The standard is supposed to be a stringent one, 
and although the Executive Branch has carefully preserved its authority not 
to defend challenged statutes, it has also consistently acknowledged a 
general duty to do so.27 
It was this duty that critics of the Obama Administration’s DOMA 
decision used to challenge the President’s claim that the DOJ could 
properly decline to defend a statute that the President believed to be 
unconstitutional. But although the Executive Branch and commentators 
have long acknowledged the Executive Branch’s duty to defend challenged 
statutes, the precise scope and source of this duty has never been clear. In 
this Part, after providing some background on the Executive Branch’s role 
as the United States’ agent in court and the circumstances in which the duty 
to defend can arise, I examine this so-called duty and argue that neither of 
the two principal justifications for such a duty support its existence. 
A. Executive Branch as the United States 
Since the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Executive Branch has been tasked 
with the appointment of “person[s] learned in the law to act as attorney[s] 
for the United States.”28 In 1870, the DOJ was established “to eliminate the 
reliance on private lawyers in litigation” and “to centralize the [Executive 
Branch’s] counseling function.”29 Although the goals of centralization were 
not fully realized then, they came to fruition with the New Deal when “the 
modern framework was put in place.”30 At that point, President Roosevelt 
issued an executive order that “transferred to the Department of Justice” 
“functions of prosecuting in the courts of the United States claims and 
demands by, and offenses against, the Government of the United States and 
of defending claims and demands against the Government, and of 
 
26  Gussis, supra note 23, at 610. 
27  In letters to the Senate Legal Counsel advising the Senate that the DOJ would not be defending a 
statute in court, “Attorney General Griffin Bell closed his letters with the following statement: ‘The 
Department of Justice is, of course, fully mindful of its duty to support the laws enacted by Congress. 
Here, however, the Department has determined, after careful study and deliberation, that reasonable 
arguments cannot be advanced to defend the challenged statute.’” Drew S. Days III, Lecture, In Search 
of the Solicitor General’s Clients: A Drama with Many Characters, 83 KY. L.J. 485, 503 (1995) 
(quoting Letter from Attorney Gen. Griffin Bell to Sen. Robert Byrd 2 (May 8, 1979)). 
28  1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789). The Judiciary Act also created the office of “attorney-general for the United 
States, . . . whose duty it shall be to prosecute and conduct all suits in the Supreme Court in which the 
United States shall be concerned.” Id. at 93. 
29  Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Uneasy Case for Department of Justice Control of Federal 
Litigation, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 558, 559‒60 (2003) (emphasis omitted). 
30  Id. at 559‒60 (noting that the Executive Branch’s management of the United States’ litigation 
remained “diffuse and decentralized” until the twentieth century). 
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supervising the work of United States attorneys, marshals, and clerks in 
connection therewith.”31 
Today, “the conduct of litigation in which the United States, an 
agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested . . . is reserved to 
officers of the Department of Justice.”32 The DOJ carries out these 
responsibilities under the auspices of the Attorney General, who is given 
the responsibility to “supervise all litigation to which the United States, an 
agency, or officer thereof is a party”33 and the power to send “[t]he Solicitor 
General, or any officer of the Department of Justice . . . to any State or 
district in the United States to attend to the interests of the United States in 
a suit pending in a court of the United States, or in a court of a State, or to 
attend to any other interest of the United States.”34 As the Supreme Court 
has explained, the Attorney General “is the hand of the President in taking 
care that the laws of the United States in protection of the interests of the 
United States in legal proceedings and in the prosecution of offences, be 
faithfully executed.”35 
Central to the contemporary mission of the DOJ is the “defen[se] [of] 
the interests of the United States according to the law.”36 By virtue of this 
statutory responsibility, the DOJ employs thousands of attorneys to 
represent the “United States” at all levels of the federal judicial system.37 In 
some cases, the “United States” begins as a named party, prosecuting the 
accused or defending against a legal claim; in others, the “United States” 
technically begins as a stranger to the case, but intervenes to protect its 
interests;38 and finally, in still others, the United States never formally 
becomes a party, but nonetheless shares its views with the court as an 
amicus.39 
 
31  Exec. Order No. 6166, § 5 (1933), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 901 (2006). President 
Wilson had earlier made a similar attempt, “but the change was largely ineffective and, in any event, 
temporary.” Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Battle that Never Was: Congress, the White House, and 
Agency Litigation Authority, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 207 n.8 (1998). 
32  28 U.S.C. § 516 (2006). The statute does provide that other statutory provisions may trump this 
reservation in particular cases. See id. 
33  Id. § 519. 
34  Id. § 517. 
35  Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 262 (1922); see also Devins & Herz, supra note 29, at 560 (“In 
general, then, the Department of Justice is the litigator for the United States and its administrative 
agencies. Agencies may not employ outside counsel for litigation and must refer all matters to DOJ.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
36  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OVERVIEW 1 (2011), available at http://
www.justice.gov/jmd/2012summary/pdf/fy12-bud-summary-request-performance.pdf. 
37  See id. at 3. 
38  See § 2403(a) (allowing the United States to intervene to defend the constitutionality of a federal 
statute). 
39  See, e.g., Omari Scott Simmons, Picking Friends from the Crowd: Amicus Participation as 
Political Symbolism, 42 CONN. L. REV. 185, 213 (2009) (“Today, as much as forty-five percent of the 
Solicitor General’s argumentation is through amicus submission.”). 
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Whatever its point of entry, the Executive Branch’s influence on 
judicial decisionmaking is often significant. It may be the “province and 
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,”40 but the Executive 
Branch often plays a significant role in helping the judiciary make that 
determination.41 Executive branch lawyers appearing in federal courts 
throughout the judicial system facilitate courts’ resolution of disputes by 
providing what are purportedly the United States’ views on a variety of 
issues, ranging from fine questions of statutory interpretation to significant 
questions of constitutional law, and identifying the potential consequences 
that might result from the courts’ decisions.42 
B. The Duty to Defend 
Although commentators generally suggest that the duty to defend is a 
monolithic concept, a fixed obligation of the Executive Branch that always 
arises in exactly the same way and carries with it exactly the same 
responsibilities, there are at least three different contexts in which the duty 
to defend arises. 
1. The Trial Court.—When a lawsuit is filed that challenges the 
constitutionality of a statute, the government and government officials will 
often be named as defendants.43 In such cases, the government has an 
obligation to file an answer or otherwise respond to the lawsuit, lest it lose 
the case by default. In such cases, defending the statute will be an inevitable 
part of the general defense of the lawsuit, and it is at this stage of the 
litigation that the Executive Branch will generally lay the foundation for 
defending the statute’s constitutionality, compiling the factual evidence and 
 
40  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
41  See Todd Lochner, Note, The Relationship Between the Office of Solicitor General and the 
Independent Agencies: A Reevaluation, 79 VA. L. REV. 549, 561 (1993) (“By far the most frequent amici 
before the Court, the United States is also one of the most successful. On average, the Office wins 
seventy-five percent of the cases in which it participates as amicus curiae . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
42  Cf. Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Solicitor General’s Changing Role in 
Supreme Court Litigation, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1323, 1338 (2010) (“[T]he Solicitor General’s participation 
in the Supreme Court’s docket has become nearly pervasive. . . . [T]he Solicitor General has been 
participating in seventy-five percent of the merits cases since the mid-1990s, though increasingly in 
cases where the government itself is not a party.”); Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The 
Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 782 (2000) (“[T]he 
interests of the executive branch and of Congress are nearly always represented in the Supreme Court by 
the Solicitor General . . . .”). 
43  See, e.g., Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011) (Commonwealth of 
Virginia suing the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to challenge federal 
health care reform); United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part 132 S. Ct. 2492 
(2012) (U.S. DOJ suing the State of Arizona to challenge Arizona’s controversial immigration statute). 
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legal arguments that will enable it to make the strongest possible case for 
the statute’s constitutionality.44 
The Obama Administration’s decision not to defend DOMA arose at 
just this stage in the litigation in cases in the Southern District of New York 
and the District of Connecticut.45 Although the DOJ had previously 
defended the statute,46 it explained that it had done so in jurisdictions in 
which there was binding precedent holding that laws that discriminate on 
the basis of sexual orientation are only subject to rational basis review.47 
The Second Circuit, by contrast, did not have such precedent,48 and the 
Department and the President determined that such laws should be subject 
to heightened scrutiny and that DOMA was unconstitutional when subject 
to that scrutiny.49 
Thus, while recognizing that “the Department has a longstanding 
practice of defending the constitutionality of duly-enacted statutes if 
reasonable arguments can be made in their defense,” the Department 
explained that “[t]his is the rare case where the proper course is to forgo the 
defense of this statute.”50 The Department offered two possible explanations 
for its decision, but did not make clear whether both were necessary. First, 
it noted that “the Department in the past has declined to defend statutes 
despite the availability of professionally responsible arguments, in part 
because the Department does not consider every plausible argument to be a 
‘reasonable’ one.”51 Second, it noted that “the Department has declined to 
defend a statute ‘in cases in which it is manifest that the President has 
concluded that the statute is unconstitutional,’ as is the case here.”52 
At the end of his letter to the Speaker of the House, the Attorney 
General advised that “[a] motion to dismiss in the [relevant] cases would be 
 
44  Although the trial court is supposed to establish the factual record on which the case will be 
decided, that is often not the case. See Gorod, supra note 22, at 28‒35. 
45  See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt.. No. 
3:10-cv-01750-VLB (D. Conn. Nov. 9, 2010); Complaint, Windsor v. United States, No. 10-cv-8435 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2010). 
46  See, e.g., Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010), aff’d sub nom. 
Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012). 
47  See Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of 
Representatives, supra note 8, at 1–2 (“Previously, the Administration has defended [DOMA] Section 3 
in jurisdictions where circuit courts have already held that classifications based on sexual orientation are 
subject to rational basis review, and it has advanced arguments to defend DOMA Section 3 under the 
binding standard that has applied in those cases.”). 
48  See id. at 2 (“These new lawsuits, by contrast, will require the Department to take an affirmative 
position on the level of scrutiny that should be applied to DOMA Section 3 in a circuit without binding 
precedent on the issue.”). 
49  See id. 
50  Id. at 5. 
51  Id. 
52  Id. (quoting Seth P. Waxman, Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1073, 1083 (2001)). 
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due on March 11, 2011,”53 so that Congress could continue defending the 
statute if it were inclined to do so. It was. Just days before the motion to 
dismiss was due, the House (specifically, the House’s Bipartisan Leadership 
Advisory Group, by a 3–2 party-line vote) decided to fill the vacuum 
created by the Department’s decision not to defend the statute.54 The House 
Speaker explained that “[t]he constitutionality of this law should be 
determined by the courts—not by the president unilaterally—and this action 
by the House will ensure the matter is addressed in a manner consistent 
with our Constitution.”55 The House’s retained counsel (a former Solicitor 
General then in private practice56) thus assumed responsibility for 
developing the record and legal arguments that the courts will use to 
determine the constitutionality of DOMA. 
2. On Appeal.—If the Executive Branch had continued to defend 
DOMA in the district courts, its obligation to defend the statute would not 
necessarily have come to an end when the district court cases did. The duty 
to defend arguably also includes the obligation to appeal adverse trial court 
decisions to appellate courts and to petition the Supreme Court to grant 
certiorari in cases where there is an adverse decision in the courts of 
appeals. After all, in the absence of such an appeal, the challenged law is, at 
least for some purposes and in some places, void. 
But some commentators have suggested that there may not be a duty to 
appeal, even if there is a duty to defend in the trial court. Former Solicitor 
General Ted Olson, for example, has suggested that the Executive Branch 
 
53  Id. at 6 (“Our attorneys will also notify the courts of our interest in providing Congress a full and 
fair opportunity to participate in the litigation in those cases.”). 
54  See Molly K. Hooper, House Leaders Vote to Intervene in DOMA Defense, THE HILL (Mar. 9, 
2011, 6:43 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/148521-house-leaders-vote-to-
intervene-in-doma-defense (“In a party-line vote of 3-2, the five-member BLAG . . . gave the House 
general counsel the authority to retain outside counsel to defend the Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA).”); see also Carolyn Lochhead, Nancy Pelosi Asks John Boehner How Much DOMA Litigation 
Will Cost, SFGATE POLITICSBLOG (Mar. 11, 2011, 12:46 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/blogs/
nov05election/detail?entry_id=84843#ixzz1GgMd92ov (“The American people want Congress to be 
working on the creation of jobs and ensuring the continued progress of our economic recovery rather 
than involving itself unnecessarily in such costly and divisive litigation.” (quoting Rep. Nancy Pelosi 
explaining her opposition to the House’s continued defense of the statute)). 
55  Marcia Coyle, Boehner Says House Will Intervene to Support Defense of Marriage Act, BLT: 
BLOG OF LEGALTIMES (Mar. 4, 2011, 4:09 PM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2011/03/boehner-
says-house-will-intervene-to-support-defense-of-marriage-act.html (quoting Rep. John Boehner). 
56  See, e.g., Amanda Terkel, DOMA Defense: Lawmakers Puzzled Where House GOP Is Getting the 
Money to Pay Paul Clement, HUFFINGTON POST (May 13, 2011, 5:54 PM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/13/doma-defense-gop-paul-clement_n_861548.html. Clement’s 
defense of the law became the subject of considerable controversy after his law firm, King & Spalding, 
decided to withdraw from the litigation, and Clement in turn resigned from the firm. See, e.g., Ashby 
Jones, After King & Spalding Drops DOMA Case, Clement Drops Firm, WALL ST. J.L. BLOG (Apr. 25, 
2011, 12:09 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/04/25/after-king-spalding-drops-doma-case-clement-
drops-firm/. 
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could decide not to appeal an adverse trial court decision because there 
would, at that point, be a judicial determination that the law is 
unconstitutional. In the context of discussing the litigation surrounding 
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” Olson maintained that “[i]t would be appropriate 
for [the Government] to say ‘the law has been deemed unconstitutional, we 
are not going to seek further review of that.’”57 Others have suggested that 
the government can choose not to appeal where doing so is in the United 
States’ long-term interests, either because success in the case is unlikely58 or 
because appealing in that particular case might affect the government’s 
“relationship with the Court.”59 
In the context of deciding whether to petition for certiorari before the 
Supreme Court, the government may also decide that “limiting the cases in 
which review is sought” may make it “more likely to obtain plenary review 
in those cases where it is most important.”60 For this reason, then-Assistant 
Attorney General Rex Lee has distinguished between the duty to defend and 
the duty to appeal, explaining that situations where the DOJ does not defend 
a federal statute “should not be confused with situations in which the 
Department defends the constitutionality of a statute unsuccessfully in 
lower courts but does not seek an appeal.”61 
3. Intervention.—The first two contexts in which the duty to defend 
arises both involve situations in which the government itself is a named 
defendant. But there are cases in which the constitutionality of a statute is at 
issue and the government is nonetheless not a named party. In such cases, 
 
57  Dwyer, supra note 8 (quoting Ted Olson). 
58  See Cordray & Cordray, supra note 42, at 1329‒30 (“[T]he Solicitor General considers whether 
the facts of a particular case present the issues and the government’s position favorably, how the case 
will impact the long-term development of the law, whether the subject area will be of interest to the 
Court, and whether the government will win on the merits.”); cf. Letter from Andrew W. Stroud, 
Counsel for Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, to the Honorable Ronald M. George, Chief Justice of the 
Cal. Supreme Court 2 (Sept. 8, 2010), available at http://metroweekly.com/poliglot/2010/09/08/Gov 
Letter Brief.pdf (“Litigation involves strategic decisions. The filing of a notice of appeal is one such 
strategic decision.”). 
59  Rex E. Lee, Lawyering for the Government: Politics, Polemics & Principle, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 
595, 598 (1986); see also infra Part III.C (discussing the Solicitor General’s special relationship with the 
Court). 
60  Representation of Congress and Congressional Interests in Court: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 6 (1975–1976) 
[hereinafter Buckley Hearings] (statement of Rex E. Lee, Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Div.); see also 
Cordray & Cordray, supra note 42, at 1330 (“The Solicitor General also must prioritize, bringing only 
the most important cases to the Court.”). It is admittedly a bit odd to suggest that the government might 
ever view a decision holding a federal law unconstitutional as insufficiently significant to merit the 
Supreme Court’s review. Indeed, the Supreme Court will generally grant certiorari in such 
circumstances. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Lochner’s Legacy for Modern Federalism: Pierce County v. 
Guillen as a Case Study, 85 B.U. L. REV. 727, 733 (2005) (“Because the Washington Supreme Court 
had held a federal statute unconstitutional, there was no question that the U.S. Supreme Court would 
grant certiorari in the case.”). 
61  Buckley Hearings, supra note 60, at 6. 
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the government must decide whether to intervene to defend the statute’s 
constitutionality. 
At the federal level, the need for government intervention to defend the 
constitutionality of statutes came to the fore during the New Deal when the 
Supreme Court frequently struck down New Deal legislation, even in cases 
between private parties in which the United States had no opportunity to 
present its views.62 As a result, Congress enacted a statute which provided 
that: 
[W]here[] the constitutionality of any Act of Congress affecting the public 
interest is drawn in question, the court shall certify such fact to the Attorney 
General, and shall permit the United States to intervene for presentation of 
evidence, if evidence is otherwise admissible in the case, and for argument on 
the question of constitutionality.63 
This statute has frequently provided the basis for government intervention. 
For example, when two men who were sued for assault under the Violence 
Against Women Act’s private right of action provision argued that 
“Congress lacked constitutional authority to enact” that provision, the 
Government intervened in the district court to defend the statute.64 
The question of intervention is in some respects very different from the 
two preceding questions. The government has not been called into court to 
answer for the supposed problems with the statute, and the government 
generally need not worry that the statute will go undefended if it does not 
offer a defense. That said, few private litigants will wield the resources of 
the federal government, and they may not be in the best position to provide 
the strongest arguments in support of the statute’s constitutionality. 
Moreover, private litigants will be primarily concerned about winning the 
case; those interests may or may not coincide with defending fully the 
constitutionality of the statute. 
 
62  See, e.g., Arthur S. Miller & Jeffrey H. Bowman, Presidential Attacks on the Constitutionality of 
Federal Statutes: A New Separation of Powers Problem, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 51, 57 (1979) (“Particularly 
vexatious to the President and Congress was that many of these decisions resulted from private suits in 
which no one appeared on behalf of the government. Public policy was being made in those lawsuits, 
which at times concerned only trivial matters for the litigants but had portentous consequences for the 
nation.” (footnote omitted)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 75-212, at 2 (1937) (“The people generally, who 
then become directly interested in and vitally affected by what otherwise would be a private lawsuit, are 
entitled to have their representative appear with the right to present whatever evidence and argument 
may be necessary fully to develop and adequately to present that issue to the court.”). 
63  28 U.S.C. § 2403(a) (2006) (“The United States shall, subject to the applicable provisions of law, 
have all the rights of a party and be subject to all liabilities of a party as to court costs to the extent 
necessary for a proper presentation of the facts and law relating to the question of constitutionality.”). 
The same statute provides that the state attorney general should similarly be notified where the 
constitutionality of a state statute is called into question. See id. § 2403(b). 
64  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 12, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (No. 99-5); 
see also Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949, 956 (4th Cir. 1997) (“The 
United States intervened to defend the constitutionality of VAWA.”). 
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C. Justifications for the Duty to Defend 
Although the idea that the Executive Branch has a duty to defend 
challenged statutes is well-established, where this duty comes from is not.65 
To the contrary, what little literature exists on the subject largely elides the 
question. But the question is important because if there is not an absolute 
duty to defend that exists in all contexts, then there is reason to question 
whether it always makes sense for the Executive Branch to act as agent for 
the whole in this context and, in particular, whether it makes sense for the 
Executive Branch to defend challenged statutes where it has questions 
about their constitutionality. The idea that there is a duty to defend seems to 
rest upon two distinct premises: (1) that the Executive Branch’s 
responsibility to enforce the law also includes a responsibility to defend it 
and (2) that the United States should speak with one voice through the 
Executive Branch.66 
1. Enforcement  Defense.—This duty to defend challenged statutes 
has been given to the Executive—and, more significantly, been viewed as 
exclusively belonging to the Executive—because commentators have 
assumed that the defense of statutes is no different than their enforcement. 
For purposes of enforcing statutes, the Executive is essentially the “United 
States.” Responsibility for the faithful execution of the laws is textually 
committed to the President in the Constitution;67 indeed, it is fundamental to 
the separation of powers that the Legislature does not participate in the 
execution of the law.68 And the Executive Branch enjoys significant 
discretion in determining how and when the laws of the United States 
should be enforced. As the Supreme Court has recognized, “an agency’s 
decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal 
process, is a decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute 
 
65  Although “the conduct of litigation in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a 
party, or is interested . . . is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice,” § 516, this statutory 
provision does not seem to impose an absolute duty on the Department to defend challenged statutes in 
all circumstances. 
66  There may also be less legally grounded motivations for advancing the idea that there is a duty to 
defend. Neal Devins and Saikrishna Prakash argue that the concept of a duty to defend serves the self-
interests of the DOJ and, to a lesser extent, the White House. See Devins & Prakash, supra note 20, at 
510‒11. 
67  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
68  See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726‒27 (1986) (“To permit an officer controlled by 
Congress to execute the laws would be, in essence, to permit a congressional veto. Congress could 
simply remove, or threaten to remove, an officer for executing the laws in any fashion found to be 
unsatisfactory to Congress. This kind of congressional control over the execution of the laws, Chadha 
makes clear, is constitutionally impermissible.”); Joel K. Goldstein, The Presidency and the Rule of 
Law: Some Preliminary Explorations, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 791, 800 (1999) (“[T]he Constitution 
imposes upon the President the obligation to administer law . . . through the Vesting Clause . . . [and] the 
Take Care Clause.”). 
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discretion.”69 There are, of course, modest limits to this authority,70 but it is 
nonetheless the case that when the “United States” is enforcing its laws, it 
is, in practice, the Executive Branch that is doing the enforcing. 
Because responsibility for executing the law is committed to the 
Executive Branch,71 commentators have assumed that responsibility for 
defending the law is as well.72 They have assumed, in other words, that the 
enforcement of statutes and the defense of statutes are both properly viewed 
as species of executing the law. One court of appeals, for example, has 
suggested that 
[A statute] designat[ing] the Senate Legal Counsel, upon a separate resolution 
of the Senate alone, to appear as the defender of all statutes on behalf of the 
United States itself . . . might . . . trench on the prerogatives of the executive 
branch of the United States, which has the authority to execute the laws of this 
country.73 
The Executive Branch itself has made this assumption. In an Attorney 
General opinion from 1980 that provides one of the most extended 
treatments of the Executive Branch’s duty to defend challenged statutes, 
Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti treats the concepts of defense of the 
law and execution of the law as virtually inseparable, referring repeatedly to 
the Attorney General’s “duty to defend and enforce” constitutionally 
objectionable legislation.74 
Other commentators, too, have made the same assumption. Former 
Solicitor General Kenneth Starr explained that when the constitutionality of 
a statute was challenged, it “became our duty ‘in faithfully executing the 
 
69  Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985); cf. In Moving KSM Trial, DOJ Blames Congress, 
BLT: BLOG OF LEGALTIMES (Apr. 4, 2011, 1:50 PM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2011/04/in-
moving-ksm-trial-doj-blames-congress.html (citing Attorney General Holder as saying that “decisions 
about where to prosecute belong in the executive branch of government”). 
70  See, e.g., Heckler, 470 U.S. at 833 n.4 (noting that an agency’s decision might be reviewable 
“where it could justifiably be found that the agency has ‘consciously and expressly adopted a general 
policy’ that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities” (quoting Adams 
v. Richardson, 480 F. 2d 1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc))). 
71  See, e.g., Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional 
Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1280 (1996) (“One of the President’s most important functions is 
to execute the civil and criminal laws of the United States.”). 
72  See, e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, Lecture, Executive Defense of Congressional Acts, 61 DUKE L.J. 
1183, 1192‒95 (2012) (discussing conflicting views regarding whether the Take Care Clause implies a 
duty to defend); Winkler, supra note 10 (“For decades, presidents, Democrats and Republicans alike, 
have taken the position that it’s the executive’s obligation to defend the constitutionality of all federal 
laws. The basis for this view is the Constitution’s command that the president ‘shall take Care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed.’”). 
73  Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 313 F.3d 495, 497‒98 (9th Cir. 2002). 
74  The Attorney General’s Duty to Defend and Enforce Constitutionally Objectionable Legislation, 
43 Op. Att’y Gen. 275, 275‒76 (1980) (adding that “the Attorney General could lawfully decline to 
enforce [a patently unconstitutional law]; and he could lawfully decline to defend it in court”). 
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law’ to go forward and defend the constitutionality of the statute.”75 Edward 
Corwin has argued that “once a statute has been duly enacted, whether over 
[the President’s] protest or with his approval, he must promote its 
enforcement by all the powers constitutionally at his disposal unless and 
until enforcement is prevented by regular judicial process.”76 Another 
commentator has explained that “[s]eparation of powers means, among 
other things, that Congress legislates and that the President faithfully 
executes the laws. ‘Execution’ means enforcement, but it also implies the 
responsibility to defend and to uphold the laws against attacks in court.”77 
Finally, others have explained that the need for executive defense of 
challenged statutes derives from the fact that “only the Executive Branch 
can execute the statutes of the United States.”78 
But there is a difference between enforcing a law and defending it. 
Enforcing the law requires the Executive Branch to make determinations 
about how the law should be implemented and what it should look like in 
practice.79 Defending the law, by contrast, does not focus on the operation 
 
75  Kenneth W. Starr, Remarks, Perspectives on the Judiciary, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 475, 480, 485 
(1990). 
76  EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787‒1957, at 66 (4th rev. ed. 1957); 
see also Arthur S. Miller, The President and Faithful Execution of the Laws, 40 VAND. L. REV. 389, 396 
(1987) (“Judicially challenging the constitutionality of a statute may not be tantamount to refusing to 
obey the statute, but it comes close.”). 
77  Note, Executive Discretion and the Congressional Defense of Statutes, 92 YALE L.J. 970, 970 
(1983); see also Gussis, supra note 23, at 601 (“The President’s duty to ‘take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed’ not only requires enforcement, but also implies the President’s responsibility to 
defend the laws against attacks in court.” (footnote omitted)). Although a Ninth Circuit panel once 
suggested that the Executive Branch’s failure to defend a challenged statute raised constitutional 
questions, see Lear Siegler, Inc., Energy Prods. Div. v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102, 1123 n.15 (9th Cir. 
1988) (“A more established practice of the executive branch is to decline to defend a challenged statute 
in court, although this, too, raises a constitutional issue.”), that portion of the opinion was subsequently 
withdrawn by the en banc court, see 893 F.2d 205, 206 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc). 
At the state level, too, people have located state executives’ obligations to defend state statutes 
against constitutional challenge in parallel constitutional provisions providing that the state executive 
should take care that the laws be faithfully executed. Indeed, the proponents of Proposition 8 charged 
Governor Schwarzenegger with violating that obligation when he refused to defend Proposition 8 in 
court. See Verified Petition for Alternative Writ of Mandamus at 8, Beckley v. Schwarzenegger, No. 
3:09-cv-2292 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2010), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/36762974/
Beckley-v-Schwarzenegger-Writ-of-Mandamus-Petition (“Governor Schwarzenegger has a duty to see 
that the laws are faithfully executed.” (citing CAL. CONST. art. V, § 13)). 
78  Attorney General’s Duty to Defend and Enforce, 43 Op. Att’y Gen. at 276 (“[I]f executive 
officers were to adopt a policy of ignoring or attacking Acts of Congress whenever they believed them 
to be in conflict with the provisions of the Constitution, their conduct in office could jeopardize the 
equilibrium established within our constitutional system.”); see also James W. Cobb, Note, By 
“Complicated and Indirect” Means: Congressional Defense of Statutes and the Separation of Powers, 
73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 205, 208 (2004) (arguing that when Congress defends a statute, it “delegate[s] 
the power to execute the law to itself”); id. at 224 (“[T]he [Senate Legal Counsel’s] defense of a statute 
‘is the very essence of “execution” of the law.’” (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986))). 
79  See, e.g., Mary M. Cheh, When Congress Commands a Thing to Be Done: An Essay on Marbury 
v. Madison, Executive Inaction, and the Duty of the Courts to Enforce the Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
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of the law and generally will not affect its operation at all. Rather, in 
defending a statute, the Executive simply provides the court with its 
understanding of what the Constitution requires and its argument for why 
the law at issue is consistent with it. To be sure, there may be situations in 
which the defense of a law and its enforcement are (at least seemingly) 
intertwined, but there remains a meaningful difference between the two 
concepts. Indeed, one court of appeals has disaggregated the concepts of 
enforcement and defense, describing the President’s authority to refuse to 
enforce a statute as “dubious at best,” while describing his authority to 
refuse to defend a statute in court as “undisputed.”80 Although the 
Executive’s authority to refuse to defend a statute is hardly undisputed,81 
what is important is the court’s recognition of the distinction between the 
concepts of enforcement and defense. 
Moreover, enforcing the law is exclusively reserved to the Executive 
Branch. Thus, when the Executive Branch declines to enforce a law, the 
President is in fact engaging in a sort of “negative Executive lawmaking,”82 
effectively repealing the statute without the participation of the 
Legislature.83 To be sure, it is not literally a repeal of the law—the law 
remains on the books and could be enforced by a future president—but it 
still means that the law is essentially without effect for the duration of the 
period of nonenforcement. When the Executive Branch declines to defend a 
law, by contrast, the law remains in operation,84 and someone else can 
 
253, 276 (2003) (“[T]he executive branch was responsible for implementing the law, meaning the 
executive branch had the duty to enforce the law.”); Lawson & Moore, supra note 71, at 1284‒85 
(describing the executive power as the power to put laws into effect); Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of 
Executive Power, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 259, 315 (2009) (“[E]nforcing the laws is not a mechanical task. 
Many statutes are ambiguous and have not been definitively interpreted by the courts. Many other 
statutes delegate considerable authority to the executive branch to decide how the underlying purposes 
of the statutes should be effectuated.”). 
80  Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 787 F.2d 875, 889 (3d Cir. 1986). 
81  See, e.g., infra note 162. 
82  E.g., Eugene Gressman, Take Care, Mr. President, 64 N.C. L. REV. 381, 382‒83 (1986) (“Such 
refusal to execute, even though due to constitutional doubts about the statute, amounts to a partial repeal 
of the statute—a repeal that constitutionally can be effected only through the normal legislative 
processes.”). To be sure, the law remains on the books and could be enforced by a subsequent President, 
but that does not change the fact that the law will go unenforced in the meantime. See id. at 382 
(“[W]hen the President tries to do more than he is permitted by statute, he becomes a lawmaker, a status 
foreign to the constitutional division of power.”). 
83  See id. 
84  Of course, there is a rich literature on whether and when the President may decline to enforce a 
statute that he believes is unconstitutional. See, e.g., David Barron, Constitutionalism in the Shadow of 
Doctrine: The President’s Non-Enforcement Power, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61 (2000); Dawn E. 
Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement of Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes, 63 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 (2000). That debate is beyond the scope of my Article, and I do not take a position 
on it other than to note that the nondefense of statutes is, in my view, far less troubling than their 
nonenforcement. See Gressman, supra note 82, at 384 (“[T]he Executive can refuse to defend the 
constitutionality of a statute when judicial review has been properly instituted. But this right is a far cry 
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explain to the court why the statute should be upheld.85 It is then left to the 
courts to determine whether the law is, in fact, constitutional—just as they 
would have done had the Executive Branch continued to defend the statute. 
Moreover, in such a situation, these new defenders of the law are in no 
sense intruding on the Executive Branch’s authority to enforce the law 
because they are not determining how or when the law should be 
implemented.86 
Thus, enforcement and defense are, in my view, distinct activities, and 
only the former is properly viewed as a species of the Executive Branch’s 
obligation to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. Under this 
view, this first justification for the notion that the Executive Branch has an 
absolute duty to defend challenged statutes is unpersuasive. 
2. United States v. United States.—Another reason why the 
Executive Branch has been viewed as having a duty to defend challenged 
statutes (although one more implicit in the commentary) seems to rest upon 
the view that it is inappropriate for the United States to speak with more 
than one voice in court and that the Executive Branch should be the United 
States’ exclusive agent in this context. The Supreme Court, in fact, has 
described the proposition that “there is more than one ‘United States’ that 
may appear before this Court” as “somewhat startling.”87 It has also noted 
that 
 
from saying that the Executive may express his constitutional displeasure with a duly enacted statute by 
ignoring or refusing to execute it in the first instance.”). 
85  Indeed, the Executive Branch is often not alone in explaining to the Court why statutes should be 
upheld even when it chooses to defend them; rather, amici often aid the Executive Branch in its defense 
of challenged statutes. To be sure, there is a meaningful difference between party status and amicus 
status, and amicus participation is less frequent in the trial court, but the existence of this amicus 
participation at any level nonetheless suggests reason to question whether there is anything inherently 
problematic with nonexecutive actors defending statutes in court. For discussions of alternatives to 
executive defense of statutes and an argument that such alternatives are permissible, see infra Part IV. 
86  To be sure, in the course of defending a statute, its proponents may offer their own interpretations 
of the statute’s meaning. Such interpretations offered in litigation, however, need not be viewed as 
binding on the government and almost certainly should not be viewed as binding if made by an entity 
other than the Executive Branch. Cf. Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 476 (1992) 
(“If the Director asked us to defer to his new statutory interpretation, this case might present a difficult 
question regarding whether and under what circumstances deference is due to an interpretation 
formulated during litigation.”); Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988) (“[W]e 
have declined to give deference to an agency counsel’s interpretation of a statute where the agency itself 
has articulated no position on the question, on the ground that ‘Congress has delegated to the 
administrative official and not to appellate counsel the responsibility for elaborating and enforcing 
statutory commands.’” (quoting Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 628 (1971))). 
87  United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693, 701 (1988); see also United States v. An 
Easement & Right of Way, 204 F. Supp. 837, 839 (E.D. Tenn. 1962) (“It appears to the Court that there 
could not be any issue between the TVA and the FHA, both being the United States, which this Court 
could litigate or adjudicate.”). 
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[One reason] for reserving litigation in this Court to the Attorney General and 
the Solicitor General, is the concern that the United States usually should 
speak with one voice before this Court, and with a voice that reflects not the 
parochial interests of a particular agency, but the common interests of the 
Government and therefore of all the people.88 
Similarly, in denying the Senate standing in a case, the Ninth Circuit noted 
that “[a] public law, after enactment, is not the Senate’s any more than it is 
the law of any other citizen or group of citizens in the United States. It is a 
law of the United States of America,”89 and the court bemoaned the 
possibility that “a challenger of a law [might] have to contend with fighting 
the United States itself, and separately defending himself against the Senate 
and the House of Representatives, each of which would be able to appear as 
a separate litigating party in the case.”90 
This concern also manifests in court doctrine, perhaps most 
significantly in political question doctrine. Under political question 
doctrine, courts are supposed to refrain from deciding certain cases that are 
more appropriately resolved outside the courts.91 Although there are many 
different situations that can trigger the application of political question 
doctrine,92 one reason courts refrain from resolving political questions is to 
avoid “the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements 
by various departments on one question.”93 In other words, there is an 
important intuition that governmental division should not be expressed in 
the courts. 
Yet despite the significance of this discomfort, it remains largely 
unexplained. Neither case law nor commentators ever make clear why it is 
embarrassing for the government to speak with more than one voice when 
that multiplicity of voices simply reflects the complicated reality of a 
multidimensional United States and a multiplicity of views regarding the 
constitutionality of a statute.94 To be sure, there are contexts in which it is 
 
88  Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. at 706; accord Days, supra note 27, at 502 (“[B]y making it 
unnecessary for Congress to become involved in litigation except in unusual cases, the Solicitor 
General’s policy of defending the acts of Congress ensures that the government speaks with one voice in 
the Supreme Court while at the same time reinforcing the Executive Branch’s status as the litigating arm 
of the government.”). 
89  Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 313 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2002). 
90  Id. at 500. 
91  See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question 
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 240 (2002) (“Underlying the 
political question doctrine and this constitutional design is the recognition that the political branches 
possess institutional characteristics that make them superior to the judiciary in deciding certain 
constitutional questions.”). 
92  Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (describing the factors that create a nonjusticiable 
political question). 
93  Id. 
94  See Michael Herz, United States v. United States: When Can the Federal Government Sue Itself?, 
32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 893, 907 (1991) (“The Court’s image of a unified federal government . . . is 
106:1201  (2012) Defending Executive Nondefense 
 1223
important for the United States to speak with one voice or to act in a unified 
manner. For example, in explaining why the Framers “commit[ted] sole 
power to lay imposts and duties on imports in the Federal Government,” the 
Court identified the need for “the Federal Government [to] speak with one 
voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments.”95 
Related, the Court has noted that a “‘concern for uniformity in this 
country’s dealings with foreign nations’ . . . animated the Constitution’s 
allocation of the foreign relations power to the National Government.”96 
But just because speaking with one voice makes sense in some 
contexts does not mean that it makes sense in all contexts.97 Where the 
United States is not speaking to an external actor, but instead determining 
internally the validity of its laws and how those laws should be interpreted, 
there does not seem to be the same importance to speaking with one voice. 
If the courts are supposed to be the final arbiters of such questions,98 or even 
play a meaningful role in answering such questions, it is unclear why we 
should have the Executive Branch determine outside of that forum which of 
the possible views of the United States will be the one represented. It seems 
far preferable to allow a multiplicity of voices into the courts and to let the 
courts use that multiplicity of views to reach the best outcome. 
Indeed, the notion that the government currently only speaks with one 
voice is simply not true. As Neal Devins and Michael Herz have discussed 
at length, “[t]o a greater degree than is often realized or acknowledged, . . . 
Congress has placed responsibility for government lawyering with attorneys 
outside DOJ,”99 and these other attorneys often have views that are distinct 
 
unrealistic.”); id. at 900 (describing the contention that “the United States is ‘one person’” as “uselessly 
conclusory”). 
95  Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976); accord Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of 
Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979) (noting that Supreme Court cases have “stress[ed] the need for 
uniformity in treating with other nations”). 
96  Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413 (2003) (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. 
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 n.25 (1964)); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 277 (James Madison) 
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) (noting the “advantage of uniformity in all points which relate to foreign 
powers”). But see Sarah H. Cleveland, Crosby and the “One-Voice” Myth in U.S. Foreign Relations, 
46 VILL. L. REV. 975, 975 (2001) (“The ‘one-voice’ doctrine is a myth. It finds little support in the 
constitutional framework, which divides the foreign relations powers among the three federal branches, 
and even less in the actual practice of the government.”). 
97  Even in those cases where it is important that the “United States” speak with one voice, there is 
still value in recognizing that the United States is composed of many competing parts which may have 
competing interests. Recognizing that fact will help ensure that meaningful consideration is given to 
sorting out those competing interests and determining which voice—and which message—should be the 
United States’ singular message. 
98  See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
99  Devins & Herz, supra note 29, at 558‒59; cf. Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and 
Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 
75 VA. L. REV. 431, 470‒72 (1989) (discussing a congressional debate over whether the Attorney 
General should represent the EPA in court). 
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from those of the Solicitor General.100 As Devins has noted, “[T]he volume 
of public disputes between the Solicitor General and independent agencies 
is far from insignificant. Substantive conflicts arise every year in cases 
argued before the Court.”101 Thus, there are often conflicts between different 
components of the Executive Branch that raise challenging questions about 
the justiciability of such disputes102 and who should control the 
government’s litigation.103 
These disputes manifest in many different ways. Sometimes they are 
subtle, hidden in the background of the case. In United States v. Mitchell, 
for example, the Court considered “whether the Indian General Allotment 
Act of 1887 authorizes the award of money damages against the United 
States for alleged mismanagement of forests located on lands allotted to 
[Native Americans] under [the] Act.”104 The Court, in agreement with the 
Solicitor General representing the “United States,” concluded that it did 
not,105 but as Justice White noted in his dissent, “[T]he Department of the 
Interior . . . disagree[d] with the position taken by the Solicitor General in 
this litigation and believe[d] that a money damages remedy should be 
permitted.”106 
At other times, the intrabranch disputes are more evident because the 
DOJ “alerts a court to conflicting agency positions, or an agency that is not 
a party participates as an amicus, taking a position in conflict with another 
 
100  See, e.g., Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General Control over 
Independent Agency Litigation, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 255, 262 (1994) (“The government does not always 
speak as a single voice before the Supreme Court. Cabinet-level departments and executive agencies 
sometimes air their disputes with each other, Congress, and independent agencies before the Supreme 
Court.”); Fraley, supra note 19, at 1256 (“Solicitor General control of independent agency litigation 
would insure that the government addressed the Court with a single and coherent voice. This, of course, 
is not the current arrangement as a number of administrative entities possess varying degrees of 
litigating authority.”); see also United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693, 702 (1988) 
(“[D]isagreement [about a case’s worthiness for certiorari] actually arises on a regular basis between the 
Solicitor General and attorneys representing various agencies of the United States.”). 
101  Devins, supra note 100, at 258‒59 (“It is atypical but not unusual to see a Solicitor General brief 
that the affected agency refuses to join or an agency brief at odds with the ‘Brief for the United 
States.’”); cf. Days, supra note 27, at 487 (“[The Solicitor General’s] responsibility is ultimately not to 
any particular agency or person in the federal government but rather to ‘the interests of the United 
States’ which may, on occasion, conflict with the short-term programmatic goals of an affected 
governmental entity.”). 
102  See, e.g., Herz, supra note 94, at 898 (“This Article attempts to define which intragovernmental 
disputes are justiciable.”). 
103  See, e.g., Devins & Herz, supra note 29, at 559 (“[W]e cast a fresh eye on the standard 
arguments for DOJ control of litigation.”); Devins & Herz, supra note 31, at 205 (“Who should speak 
the government’s voice in court?”). 
104  445 U.S. 535, 536 (1980). 
105  See id. at 546. 
106  Id. at 550 (White, J., dissenting). 
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agency that is a party.”107 Sometimes, albeit rarely, the Justice Department 
has filed multiple briefs taking different views. For example, in the 
landmark campaign finance case Buckley v. Valeo,108 the Executive Branch 
was divided on the legislation’s constitutionality, so “the Senior Deputy 
Solicitor General in the office . . . became the Acting Solicitor General to 
defend the constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act,” while 
“Attorney General Edward Levi and Solicitor General Robert Bork filed 
another brief by the government . . . express[ing] skepticism as to the 
constitutionality of the statute.”109 Thus, the Department spoke with more 
than one voice, and the world did not end. To the contrary, the world may 
have been better off because the Court had more assistance in reaching its 
decision on an important constitutional question. 
 
 * * * 
 
Thus, in the end, neither of the two primary justifications for a duty to 
defend—that it is implicit in the Executive Branch’s responsibility for 
enforcing the law or that it is improper for the United States to speak with 
more than one voice in court—is sufficient to establish the existence of a 
duty that exists in all circumstances. This does not mean that the 
Department never has a responsibility to defend challenged statutes; it 
could have a prudential obligation to defend challenged statutes even in the 
absence of a legal duty to do so. But it does mean that there is no absolute 
duty that requires the Executive Branch to defend all statutes, even ones 
that the President has concluded are unconstitutional. I next consider the 
other criticism leveled against the Obama Administration—that the 
Executive Branch nonetheless should defend challenged statutes because its 
role (at least in this context) is properly that of Congress’s agent. 
II. THE PRINCIPAL–AGENT PROBLEM 
As I noted at the outset, implicit (and sometimes explicit) in the 
criticisms of the Obama Administration’s DOMA decision was a notion 
that the Executive Branch should defend the law because it is Congress’s 
agent, and defending the law was the only way it could faithfully fill that 
 
107  Herz, supra note 94, at 934‒35 (footnote omitted). District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 
(2008), the case testing the constitutionality of the District of Columbia’s handgun ban, is another case 
in which the Executive Branch was arguably on both sides of the issue. There, the Vice President signed 
onto a congressional brief that did not take the same position as the brief of the Solicitor General’s 
office. Compare Brief for Amici Curiae 55 Members of U.S. Senate et al. Supporting Respondent, 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (No. 07-290), 2008 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 157 (brief signed by the Vice 
President), with Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Heller, 554 U.S. 570 
(No. 07-290), 2008 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 45 (Solicitor General’s brief). 
108  424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
109  Starr, supra note 75, at 485. 
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role. This notion that the Executive Branch is a simple agent—or at least 
that it can be useful to think of the Executive Branch in that way—is not 
unique to the duty-to-defend context. But there are important limitations to 
the utility of applying classic principal–agent principles to executive branch 
action. In this Part, I begin by briefly discussing classic principal–agent 
principles, and I then explore their limitations in the context of executive 
branch action. Finally, I consider what those limitations can teach us about 
the Executive Branch’s responsibility for defending challenged statutes. 
A. The Classic Principal–Agent Problem 
At common law, a principal–agent relationship is one “in which one 
person, to one degree or another or respect or another, acts as a 
representative of or otherwise acts on behalf of another person with power 
to affect the legal rights and duties of the other person.”110 Critical to this 
relationship is the principal’s “right to control the actions of the agent.”111 
The classic principal–agent problem arises because the principal cannot be 
sure that the agent will act in its best interests,112 either because the agent 
may intentionally try to subvert the principal’s best interests or because it 
simply lacks the incentives to vigorously fulfill the principal’s wishes.113 
There are various tools that a principal can use to try to address this 
problem, both ex ante and ex post. For example, the principal can provide 
the agent with very specific directions, or it can try “to create a structure 
that induces the agent to perform in the principal’s interest without 
extensive monitoring.”114 The principal can also set up penalties that will be 
imposed if the agent fails to fulfill its obligations. 
Some accounts of the Executive Branch as agent view Congress as the 
principal115 and draw upon classic principal–agent principles when 
 
110  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. c (2006). 
111  Id. (“A principal’s right to control the agent is a constant across relationships of agency, but the 
content or specific meaning of the right varies. . . . A principal’s failure to exercise the right of control 
does not eliminate it, nor is it eliminated by physical distance between the agent and principal.”). 
112  See, e.g., Stewart J. Schwab, Union Raids, Union Democracy, and the Market for Union 
Control, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 367, 376‒77 (“The principal-agent problem arises because the principal 
has difficulty evaluating the agent’s effort or the conditions under which the agent operates. Thus, the 
principal cannot easily determine whether the agent has done well for the principal or for the agent.”). 
113  See, e.g., Jerry Brito & Drew Perraut, Transparency and Performance in Government, 11 N.C. 
J.L. & TECH. 161, 162 (2010). 
114  Schwab, supra note 112, at 377; see also Thomas A. Simpson, Commentary, A Comment on an 
Inherently Flawed Concept: Why the Restatement (Third) of Agency Should Not Include the Doctrine of 
Inherent Agency Power, 57 ALA. L. REV. 1163, 1166 (2006) (identifying different ways in which the 
principal can “structure the relationship to minimize the agent’s incentives to deviate”). 
115  See, e.g., Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and Executive 
Agreements, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 690 (1998) (“[Chief Justice] Marshall characterized the executive 
as the agent or ‘organ’ of Congress.”); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation 
Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1742 (2002) (“Distrust of executive agents frequently causes 
Congress to attempt to control the smallest details of executive action . . . .”); Sidney A. Shapiro & Rena 
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discussing congressional efforts to ensure that the Executive Branch is 
acting in a manner faithful to Congress’s commands.116 Jacob Gersen, for 
example, has noted that the academic literature “is replete with suggestions 
about how and to what extent Congress can effectively control the 
bureaucracy, including the use of ex ante procedures, ex post monitoring, 
temporal limitations, budgetary appropriations, and other forms of political 
influence.”117 Congressional investigations into agency action are one ex 
post mechanism that is often the subject of considerable controversy.118 
Other scholars have discussed the extent to which Congress tries to delegate 
to agents that will be faithful to its wishes. As Daryl Levinson and Richard 
Pildes have explained, “[W]hen government is divided, congressional 
delegations move away from the Executive Office of the President and 
executive agencies and toward independent agencies and commissions,” 
 
I. Steinzor, The People’s Agent: Executive Branch Secrecy and Accountability in an Age of Terrorism, 
69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99, 104 (2006) (“[A]lthough, through statutes, Congress directs the 
executive branch, the executive branch is still the agent of the people.”); cf. Peter H. Aranson et al., A 
Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6 (1982) (“This model postulates that an 
increase in delegated legislative authority will increase ‘agency costs,’ (costs engendered by a 
divergence of the agent’s goals and those of the principal) but will also diminish the principals’ 
(legislators’) decisionmaking costs . . . .”); William E. Kovacic, Procurement Reform and the Choice of 
Forum in Bid Protest Disputes, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 461, 494 (1995) (“One reason for Congress to 
establish multiple, competing ‘agents’ is to ensure that its policy wishes are executed faithfully.”); 
Rodriguez, supra note 19, at 1198 (discussing one view of the President’s role under which, “consistent 
with his constitutional responsibility to see that the laws are ‘faithfully executed,’ [he] is to manage the 
regulatory system in order to ensure that it is an optimal engine for the proper implementation of 
congressional policies” (footnote omitted)). 
116  See, e.g., Posner & Vermeule, supra note 115, at 1742. 
117  Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. 
CT. REV. 201, 211‒12 (footnotes omitted); see id. at 212 (“This literature focuses on the use of ex ante 
and ex post mechanisms for generating or calibrating the incentives of agents to encourage them to act 
consistently with the interests of principals.”). Matthew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast 
have also discussed how an agency’s structure and processes can be used to ensure it is faithful to its 
principal, but they acknowledge that the principal is not just Congress but also the “legislative coalition 
(including the President) that succeeded in passing the agency’s enabling legislation.” McCubbins et al., 
supra note 99, at 432. 
118  See generally William P. Marshall, The Limits on Congress’s Authority to Investigate the 
President, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 781 (examining Congress’s power to investigate the President and 
arguing for process reforms). For discussion of a recent controversy over the use of the congressional 
subpoena authority to investigate an independent agency, see Dave Jamieson, House Dems Accuse Issa 
of Shilling for ‘Corporate Interests’ with NLRB Subpoena, HUFFINGTON POST (last updated Oct. 12, 
2011, 6:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/12/issa-nlrb-boeing-subpoena-house-
dems_n_925561.html. Of course, as some commentators have noted, “[C]onflicts-of-interest among the 
members of [the enacting] coalition may prevent them from effectively employing standard ex post 
corrective devices . . . .” Murray J. Horn & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Commentary on “Administrative 
Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies”: Administrative Process and Organizational Form 
as Legislative Responses to Agency Costs, 75 VA. L. REV. 499, 502 (1989). 
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that is, “the executive branch actors most insulated from presidential 
control, and perhaps also most susceptible to congressional control.”119 
Although such models of executive branch action are useful, there are, 
of course, important limitations to their utility, particularly when thinking 
normatively about the relationship between the branches and the 
appropriate parameters of executive branch action. In the context of 
executive branch action, after all, there will generally be multiple 
principals, and the principals that enacted a law will generally be without 
power to direct its execution in the future.120 Moreover, although it is not 
uncommon for an agent to have interests that diverge from those of the 
principal, the Executive Branch is in some sense unique because it is 
supposed to have interests distinct from those of the principal.121 
These limitations have important implications for how we think about 
executive branch action in many different contexts, as I discuss briefly at 
the conclusion of the Article. In the meantime, however, I focus on what 
these limitations are and what they can teach us about the Executive 
Branch’s role in defending challenged statutes. 
B. Executive Branch Action and the Principal–Agent Problem 
Simple assumptions often belie more complicated realities. The 
assumption that the Executive Branch can act as simple agent for the whole 
ignores a much more complicated reality. When the Executive Branch acts 
as agent for the whole, the principal is both multiple and changing, 
complicating efforts to direct the Executive Branch’s actions. And the 
Executive Branch is itself both agent and principal, complicating any 
assumption that it can (or should) always act faithfully for the whole.122 
 
119  Levinson & Pildes, supra note 16, at 2358 (“[W]hen Congress does choose to delegate, it will 
choose the agent most likely to share its policy preferences.”). 
120  Cf. John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States’ Rights: A Defense of Judicial 
Review in a Federal System, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 89, 94 (2004) (“Principal-agent problems are 
particularly likely in situations where there are multiple principals . . . .”). 
121  See, e.g., Levinson & Pildes, supra note 16, at 2360 (“Congress can attempt to use the usual 
tools of oversight and influence to bring the relevant agency back into line, but at least when it comes to 
executive branch agencies, there is good reason to expect that the President’s policy preferences will 
more often prevail.”); infra notes 137‒43 and accompanying text. As noted earlier, these are problems 
that often manifest in the context of corporate organizations. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. 
Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 259 (1999) (“A related point 
is that the principal-agent model assumes that it is clear who the principal is, and who the agent is in the 
particular relationship or transaction under study. Yet many of the most important relationships inside 
corporations may be more ambiguous, in the sense that both parties may be contributing productive 
inputs and neither may have authority over the other.”). 
122  See Peter Lindseth, Agents Without Principals?: Delegation in an Age of Diffuse and 
Fragmented Governance 2-3 (Univ. Conn. Sch. Law Articles & Working Papers, Paper No. 18, 2004), 
available at http://lsr.nellco.org/uconn_wps/18/ (discussing the “autonomy” enjoyed by the agent when 
a “legislative ‘principal’” delegates power “to a subordinate ‘agent’”). 
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1. Who Is the Principal?.—As noted above, in the paradigmatic 
principal–agent relationship, complications can arise because the agent is 
not faithful to the principal’s wishes. But there is, at least, a clear principal. 
It is the principal’s right and responsibility to determine the appropriate 
course of action, and the agent (in theory) will follow the principal’s 
direction. 
In the context of executive branch action, by contrast, the principal’s 
identity is (arguably) unclear, and its ability to control the agent’s action is 
(at best) incomplete. Under one view, as I noted above, Congress is the 
principal and sets out directions in its legislative commands, which the 
Executive Branch, as agent, is supposed to put into action.123 Under another 
view, the American people are the principal, and Congress and the 
President alike are their agents.124 
In some sense, of course, the American people do provide broad policy 
directions through the people they elect to higher office.125 But it is the 
people they elect who actually establish—through legislation, treaties, and 
the like—our nation’s substantive laws and policies. In that sense, it is our 
elected officials who are the principals. And the relevant elected officials 
are not just members of Congress. After all, Congress rarely acts alone in 
establishing the United States’ substantive laws and policies. For example, 
when there is a legislative command, that command most often reflects the 
will of both the President and Congress. Pursuant to the presentment 
process, the President signs almost all legislation.126 Indeed, many laws 
originate as components of the President’s legislative agenda, and the White 
House may have played a significant role in their drafting and subsequent 
passage.127 
Moreover, the principal is not necessarily the President and Congress 
in office when the particular law or policy at issue is being executed. 
Rather, the principal is the enacting legislative coalition, which will very 
often not be the legislative coalition in existence at the time of execution. 
 
123  But see Shapiro & Steinzor, supra note 115, at 104 (suggesting that the American people are the 
principals because “when legislation is enacted, it can be regarded as an expression of the people 
regarding the nature and scope of the collective action they seek”). 
124  See, e.g., Carlos E. González, Reinterpreting Statutory Interpretation, 74 N.C. L. REV. 585, 639 
(1996) (“[T]he federal Constitution as a unified whole embodies the ultimate exercise of popular 
sovereignty—the creation of an agent/government by a principal/people.”); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, 
Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1027, 1032 
(2004) (“Because both the President and the Congress are agents of the people’s will, popular control of 
constitutional meaning demands that Congress and the President must be free to make and act on their 
own interpretations of the Constitution.”). 
125  See, e.g., Horn & Shepsle, supra note 118, at 499. 
126  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (describing the presentment process). 
127  See generally James P. Pfiffner, The President’s Legislative Agenda, 499 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 22, 23 (1988) (noting that “it is a commonplace in the last decades of the twentieth 
century that the president is our chief legislator” and discussing the history of presidential involvement 
in the legislative process). 
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As Daniel Rodriguez has explained, “[A]dministrators are responsible for 
obeying the mandates of the program as constructed by the enacting 
legislature,” but “[a]gencies carry out their functions in the shadow of the 
current legislature, an institution made up of members with individual goals 
and agendas.”128 Thus, as Horn and Shepsle note, “[T]he enacting 
coalition . . . must worry not only about the potential for bureaucratic 
drift . . . , but also about the influence of subsequent political coalitions on 
the development and administration of the law.”129 
This intertemporal complication will often be salient in assessing 
whether the principal can effectively control the actions of the agent. After 
all, when the President signs a bill into law, that law generally remains on 
the books until and unless it is subsequently repealed,130 remaining valid 
even after the President and Congress that enacted it have left office.131 
Often, the current President and Congress will not support a law that their 
predecessors did,132 which means that even if Congress were institutionally 
capable of exercising control over the Executive Branch’s actions,133 the 
 
128  Rodriguez, supra note 19, at 1192; id. at 1187‒88 (noting that “regulatory policy . . . is made in 
the shadow of two legislatures,” the legislature that “enacted the statute” and “the one that exists 
contemporaneously with the program under evaluation,” and “there may be substantial differences in the 
extent of the legislature’s current commitment to the program as constituted and as functioning,” even if 
the legislature is “made up of many of the same members of the original coalition that created the 
program”); see also Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 71 
(2006) (“[O]nce post-hoc supervision comes into play, the difficulties may be magnified, with a new 
coalition or group within Congress acting in accordance with aims that may be different from those of 
the coalition that originally enacted the law being administered.”). 
129  Horn & Shepsle, supra note 118, at 499. 
130  The only exceptions are laws that contain sunset provisions that include the date of their own 
expiration. See generally Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 247 (2007). 
131  Cf. William W. Buzbee, The One-Congress Fiction in Statutory Interpretation, 149 U. PA. L. 
REV. 171, 173 (2000) (“[T]he concept of a single Congress producing legislation is undoubtedly a 
fiction. As reflected in the numbering of a new Congress every two years, different members, coalitions, 
parties, moods, and leadership change the nature of each Congress.”). Notwithstanding the regular 
change in the composition of Congress, it is well-established that the preferences of the legislative 
coalition that enacted the law are supposed to govern its execution, even after that coalition has left 
office. See, e.g., Rodriguez, supra note 19, at 1188 (“[A]gencies’ and courts’ struggles to discern what 
the enacting legislature intended, by resort to the text and legislative history of the statute, give a special 
pride of place to the preferences of the legislative coalition that enacted the statute.”). 
132  Variously referred to as “retentionist bias” and “legislative inertia,” existing law can become 
entrenched for reasons that have nothing to do with the merits of the law or the levels of support it 
currently enjoys. See, e.g., Donald R. Livingston & Samuel A. Marcosson, The Court at the Crossroads: 
Runyon, Section 1981 and the Meaning of Precedent, 37 EMORY L.J. 949, 971 n.87 (1988) (“[A] 
number of systemic factors (the congressional committee system, the executive veto, the influence of 
special interest groups) . . . give the advantage to those who resist change.”); Rodriguez, supra note 19, 
at 1188 (“Legislation that has lost current legislative support may still persist where legislative 
institutions, such as ‘gatekeeper’ committees, restrictive amendment rules, and the presidential veto, 
stand in the way of change.”). See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF 
STATUTES 102, 123‒24 (1982). 
133  This is a dubious proposition at best. Congress is itself composed of 535 different individuals 
with different interests and views and has only unwieldy tools for exercising control over any executive 
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Congress that is in office at the time the Executive Branch is acting—and 
therefore the Congress that must try to check any abuse of the Executive 
Branch’s delegated authority as it occurs—may not have the incentive to do 
so. Conversely, the actual principal—the enacting coalition—will have no 
power to control the Executive Branch’s actions. Thus, in the context of 
executive branch action, there will rarely be a principal capable of 
exercising sustained control over the agent’s actions in the same way as 
exists in the paradigmatic principal–agent context. 
2. Executive Branch as Principal and Agent.—As noted above, in the 
paradigmatic principal–agent context, agents agree to act to fulfill their 
principal’s wishes. These agents may sometimes have to make discretionary 
decisions about how to fulfill the principal’s wishes,134 but the goal remains 
the same.135 It is unsurprising then that “[p]roblems may arise . . . if the 
agent and principal have diverging interests.”136 Yet such problems are 
virtually inevitable when the Executive Branch is the putative agent because 
it will often have interests that diverge from those of the principal. The 
Executive Branch, after all, has never agreed to act only to fulfill the wishes 
of Congress (or even the people). To the contrary, it is supposed to have its 
own views on questions of both law and policy, and (at least sometimes) it 
is supposed to act on them.137 In other words, the Executive Branch is, in 
some sense, both agent and principal. 
As noted above, the Executive Branch’s role in setting the nation’s 
substantive law and policy generally begins during the legislative process 
 
branch agent. Cf. Rodriguez, supra note 19, at 1184 (“[Congress] is an unruly and far-flung lawmaking 
institution that has limited capacity to pursue systematic, focused regulatory change.”); Mark 
Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1551 
(1992) (describing the “factors [that] contribute to an institutional inertia that undercuts the effectiveness 
of direct legislative reaction as a regular means of checking agency policymaking”). This particular 
problem is, of course, not unique to the context of executive branch action. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, 
supra note 121, at 249 (“Because corporations are fictional entities that can only act through human 
agents, problems of agent fealty are frequently encountered by those who study and practice corporate 
law.”). 
134  See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 121, at 259 (noting that typical principal–agent analysis does 
not “address situations in which part of the agent’s job is to figure out what needs to be done (a situation 
we suspect is the norm rather than the exception in most public corporations)”); Simpson, supra note 
114, at 1165 (“Typically, the principal delegates some decisionmaking authority to the agent.”). 
135  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.02 reporter’s note f (2006) (“The Comment 
explores common reasons for slippage between a principal’s intention in stating instructions to an agent 
and the agent’s subsequent conduct. The Comment does not presuppose that the agent’s act stems from 
the agent’s own interests or other improper purposes.”). 
136  Simpson, supra note 114, at 1166 (“[T]he agent may choose to gratify his own interests at the 
principal’s expense.”). 
137  This relationship between the Executive Branch and the Legislature is, of course, rooted in our 
adoption of a “presidential system, with its sharp divorce of executive from legislative.” Esmond 
Wright, The Revolution and the Constitution: Models of What and for Whom?, 428 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 1, 6 (1976). 
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(through presentment and the President’s role in setting the legislative 
agenda), and it continues through the law’s execution. In part, such active 
involvement in the lawmaking process is inevitable: enforcement inherently 
necessitates some measure of discretion, requiring decisions to be made 
about how and when laws should be enforced. As the nation’s law 
enforcer,138 the Executive Branch is responsible for making those decisions, 
both domestically (for example, setting the nation’s enforcement policies in 
areas ranging from immigration to drugs) and internationally (for example, 
deciding when to bring trade disputes alleging that a trade agreement has 
been violated). In part, this responsibility also results from the broad 
delegations of power often given to the Executive Branch through 
legislation.139 In any event, whatever the cause, there can be no question that 
the Executive Branch—just like the Legislative Branch—is supposed to 
engage in substantive policymaking.140 
Indeed, if the Executive Branch were intended simply to follow 
specific legislative commands with no exercise of discretion involved, there 
would be little reason for political appointees to head executive branch 
agencies. But the Executive Branch is, of course, full of such appointees 
intended to ensure that the Executive Branch’s policymaking is reflective of 
the political and philosophical views of the President who heads it.141 As has 
 
138  See, e.g., Cheh, supra note 79, at 276 (“[T]he executive branch was responsible for 
implementing the law, meaning the executive branch had the duty to enforce the law.”). In fact, courts 
have held that Congress does not have “a direct ‘stake’ in the enforcement of [the law]. Once a law is 
passed and upheld as constitutional, Congress’s interest in its enforcement is no more than that of the 
average citizen.” Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 787 F.2d 875, 888 (3d Cir. 1986); accord 
Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Pierce, 697 F.2d 303, 305 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (noting that a Senator had 
standing where “[h]e claimed an interest which he, as a senator, had in the legislative process, different 
from any interest that he, like any other citizen, may have had in the execution of the bill once enacted”). 
139  See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (noting that Congress may 
have legislated in general terms to give the executive branch agency the opportunity to balance 
“conflicting policies” because “those with great expertise and charged with responsibility for 
administering the provision would be in a better position to do so”); David Epstein & Sharyn 
O’Halloran, The Nondelegation Doctrine and the Separation of Powers: A Political Science Approach, 
20 CARDOZO L. REV. 947, 948 (1999) (noting “the numerous cases in which the President and executive 
agencies are given real policymaking discretion in their own right, with either no statutory guidance or 
guidance that is so broad that it imposes almost no constraints on executive actions”). 
140  See, e.g., McCubbins et al., supra note 99, at 470 (“The Justice Department is itself a 
policymaking agency, and historically it has been especially closely tied to the President.”); cf. Epstein 
& O’Halloran, supra note 139, at 950 (“Congress is . . . wary . . . of ceding too much authority to 
executive branch actors who may pursue their own policy goals rather than those of the enacting 
legislative coalition.”). 
141  There is a rich literature, both descriptive and normative, that addresses the extent of presidential 
control over the administrative state. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the 
Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23 (1995); Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of 
Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123 (1994); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The 
President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994); cf. Michael Herz, Imposing Unified 
Executive Branch Statutory Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 219, 219 (1993) (noting “the 
increasingly systematic efforts of every President since Richard Nixon to gain control of the federal 
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been much discussed in the literature, there is often a resulting struggle 
between the Executive Branch and the Legislature for control over the 
administrative state.142 As one commentator has noted, “The key decision 
makers at agencies are typically political appointees, in many cases serving 
solely at the pleasure of the President. Agency officials are thus much more 
likely to be faithful agents of the executive than of Congress.”143 
The fact that the Executive Branch may have its own interests and 
views that do not fully represent or capture the interests of all of the parts 
that comprise the United States has often manifested in interbranch disputes 
in the courts.144 Indeed, the Solicitor General is often viewed as representing 
“the executive branch of the United States government,” rather than the 
United States as a whole,145 a fact which inevitably leads to conflicts of 
interest. As one commentator has noted, “[A]llowing the executive branch 
to represent its coequal partner [Congress] is like inviting the fox to guard 
the henhouse.”146 
 
bureaucracy”). Whatever one thinks about the question as a normative matter, there can be little debate 
that presidential control over the administrative state is significant, if not complete. See, e.g., Elena 
Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2248 (2001). 
142  See, e.g., LOUIS FISHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER: CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE 106 
(4th ed. 1998) (discussing “control of the bureaucracy” as a “deep-rooted” “source of executive-
legislative friction”); cf. Aranson et al., supra note 115, at 6 (“[T]he removal of politics from 
administrative processes really occurs only in civics books.”); McCubbins et al., supra note 99, at 435 
(“[T]he President’s role in appointing the top administrators of agencies offers him an advantage in 
influencing policy, especially for agencies in the executive branch where the top administrators serve at 
the pleasure of the President.”). 
143  William P. Ferranti, Interest Group Theory and Untrustworthy Outcomes: A Case Study of the 
Bonneville Power Administration, 35 MCGEORGE L. REV. 637, 646 (2004). 
144  See infra notes 147‒58 and accompanying text; see also Herz, supra note 94, at 910 (“Courts 
regularly permit interbranch litigation.”). The idea that the Executive and the Congress are sometimes at 
odds is hardly a novel one in American law and is, in some sense, inherent in our nonparliamentary 
system of government. Cf. Charles H. Koch, Jr., The Devolution of Implementing Policymaking in 
Network Governments, 57 EMORY L.J. 167, 197 (2007) (“The separation of the executive and the 
legislative in a presidential system empowers the judiciary to act as arbiters between the two.”). 
145  Rex E. Lee Conference on the Office of the Solicitor General of the United States: Pre-Reagan 
Panel, 2003 BYU L. REV. 40 (statement of Judge Frank Easterbrook); see id. at 40–41 (“[The Solicitor 
General] is litigating on behalf of the executive branch. . . . [Where] [t]he executive branch of the United 
States government, acting through the people appointed for that purpose, had settled on a particular 
antitrust policy and civil rights policy, . . . his job was to defend it.” (statement of Judge Frank 
Easterbrook)); see also Rebecca Mae Salokar, Representing Congress: Protecting Institutional and 
Individual Members’ Rights in Court, in CONGRESS AND THE POLITICS OF EMERGING RIGHTS 105, 107 
(Colton C. Campbell & John F. Stack, Jr. eds., 2002) (quoting a 1926 brief in which the petitioner noted 
that the Government was “question[ing] the constitutionality of its own act,” “the Solicitor General 
[was] appearing as a representative of the Executive Department of the Government,” and a Senator was 
“represent[ing] another branch”). 
146  Salokar, supra note 145, at 106; accord United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693, 
714 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“When faced with a difference of view between the Executive 
Branch and a coordinate branch of government, . . . the Solicitor General faces a conflict of interest that 
undeniably would be intolerable if encountered in the private sector.”); Miller & Bowman, supra note 
62, at 67‒68 (“[I]n interbranch litigation there is no such thing as ‘the United States.’ There is the 
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Consequently, Congress has frequently intervened in litigation to 
challenge the view that the Executive Branch was faithfully acting for the 
United States as a whole.147 In such cases, it is often “the United States 
Senate or the Leadership of the United States House of Representatives” 
purporting to “defend[] the interests of Congress as an institution,”148 “either 
because the Executive Branch was seen to be misinterpreting Congressional 
intent or otherwise not adequately enforcing the law”149 or because the 
“Solicitor General, while representing the United States before the Supreme 
Court, [was viewed as] fail[ing] to properly defend a federal statute.”150 
This desire to protect Congress’s own institutional interests was 
evident in Morrison v. Olson,151 a case addressing the constitutionality of 
the independent counsel provision of the Ethics in Government Act.152 The 
Act “allow[ed] for the appointment of an ‘independent counsel’ to 
investigate and, if appropriate, prosecute certain high-ranking Government 
officials for violations of federal criminal laws,”153 and it granted the 
counsel “full power and independent authority to exercise all investigative 
and prosecutorial functions and powers of the Department of Justice” “with 
 
interest of the President, as in executive privilege, and the interest of the Congress in the enforcement of 
its laws.”). 
147  See JUDITHANNE SCOURFIELD MCLAUCHLAN, CONGRESSIONAL PARTICIPATION AS AMICUS 
CURIAE BEFORE THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 1 (2005) (“Members of Congress have come to play an 
increasingly significant role as lobbyists before the U.S. Supreme Court.”); see also R. Lawrence 
Dessem, Congressional Standing to Sue: Whose Vote Is This, Anyway?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 1 
(1986) (“In recent years Members of the United States Congress have brought suit against the executive 
branch of the federal government with growing frequency.”). According to McLauchlan, this is “[t]he 
most frequent type of case in which Members of Congress file amicus briefs.” MCLAUCHLAN, supra, at 
81. 
148  MCLAUCHLAN, supra note 147, at 51; see also id. at 54 n.170 (“In 10% of the cases in which 
Members of Congress participate as amici, they do so under the auspices of the House or Senate Legal 
Counsel’s Offices, acting in the interests of the U.S. Senate or the U.S. House [of] Representatives.”). 
When the Senate or House files an institutional brief, that does not mean that every member of the body 
agrees. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 929 n.4 (1983). 
149  MCLAUCHLAN, supra note 147, at 51. 
150  Id. at 52; accord Salokar, supra note 145, at 116 (noting that Congress is most likely to be 
defending the constitutionality of a statute “where Congress must fill the shoes of the ‘United States’ 
because the Department of Justice has chosen not to, or where Congress suspects that the executive 
branch will not provide a hearty defense of the law”); see also Brief of the Speaker and Bipartisan 
Leadership Grp. of the House of Representatives as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Japan 
Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986) (Nos. 85-954, 85-955), 1986 U.S. S. Ct. 
Briefs LEXIS 347, at *3 (The House filing an amicus brief to resist “novel theories of separation of 
powers . . . presented to [the] Court indirectly by the Executive and more openly by the Japanese 
petitioners”); Brief of the Speaker & Bipartisan Leadership Grp., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 
(1986) (Nos. 85-1377, 85-1378, 85-1379), 1986 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 160, at *21 (“The Senate and 
House parties intervened [in the district court] to defend the Act against the Executive’s 
challenge . . . .”). 
151  487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
152  28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591‒598 (1982). 
153  Morrison, 487 U.S. at 660. 
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respect to all matters in such independent counsel’s prosecutorial 
jurisdiction.”154 The Executive Branch viewed this as an inappropriate grant 
of executive power and decided that the interests of the “United States” lay 
not in defending the statute, but in arguing that it was unconstitutional.155 
The Congress unsurprisingly disagreed, and both houses filed amicus briefs 
defending the legislation’s constitutionality.156 In invoking the Supreme 
Court rule that allows the United States to file amicus briefs without the 
consent of the parties,157 the House clearly sought to suggest that it (and not 
the Executive) was now acting for the United States.158 Whichever branch 
could more rightly claim that it was acting on behalf of the whole, one thing 
is clear: simple assumptions of faithful agency on the part of the Executive 
Branch proved problematic. 
C. The Duty to Defend and the Principal–Agent Problem 
As I noted at the outset, executive branch representatives act for the 
United States every day in many different contexts around the world. 
Recognizing the complications inherent in thinking of the Executive Branch 
as a simple agent may have important (and varying) implications across 
those different contexts—both in terms of determining the proper roles for 
the Executive Branch and the Legislature in effectuating our nation’s 
substantive law and policy and in determining whether (and what) controls 
may sometimes be necessary to ensure that the Executive Branch’s actions 
are consistent with the authority it has been delegated. But whatever lessons 
these complications may have to teach in other contexts, there are two clear 
lessons in the context of the Executive Branch’s role in defending 
challenged statutes. 
 
154  § 594(a). 
155  See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees, Morrison, 487 U.S. 654 
(No. 87-1279), 1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 980, at *9 (“The interest of the United States in this case 
is in preserving an important part of the power and duty of the President to ‘take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed.’”). The Executive Branch took this position in both the lower courts and in the 
Supreme Court. 
156  See Brief for the United States Senate as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant, Morrison, 487 
U.S. 654 (No. 87-1279), 1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 992; Brief of the Speaker & Leadership Grp. of 
the House of Representatives as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, Morrison, 487 U.S. 654 (No. 87-
1279), 1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 995, at *8 n.2. (“Participation by the Speaker and Leadership 
Group is the standard mechanism by which the House of Representatives pursues its institutional 
interests in litigation.”). The House and Senate both filed amicus briefs defending the constitutionality of 
the legislation in the lower court as well. See In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
157  See SUP. CT. R. 37(4). 
158  See Brief of the Speaker and Leadership Group, supra note 156, at *8 n.2 (“In light of the 
institutional nature of this participation and the status of the House of Representatives in the government 
of the United States, it would appear appropriate for the Speaker and elected leadership of the House of 
Representatives to avail themselves of the right to submit a brief as amici curiae without the consent of 
the parties, in accordance with the provisions of Sup. Ct. R. 36.4.”). 
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First, the existence of intertemporal complications means that the 
principal that enacted a law at t1 will often have no authority to control the 
agent’s actions in defending the law at t2. In the case of DOMA, this 
disconnect is obvious. DOMA was passed in 1996 by the 104th Congress 
and signed into law by President Clinton.159 Fifteen years later, there was a 
new Congress and a new President. It is utterly unsurprising that this new 
Congress and this new President have different views about DOMA and its 
constitutionality than did their predecessors.160 
But the fact that a current President and Congress may not support a 
law is irrelevant to the question of whether it should be defended (at least so 
long as the current President and Congress are unwilling to repeal the law 
through legislative action). In our constitutional system, the President and 
Congress cannot undo the work of their predecessors through implicit 
action, and the courts—not the political branches—are the final arbiters of 
constitutional questions. Recognizing that the principal that enacted the law 
has no power to ensure that it is defended means that outside actors may 
sometimes need to take up the defense of challenged statutes in cases where 
neither the current President nor the current Congress is willing to do so.161 
Second, the fact that the Executive Branch is at once both principal and 
agent makes it utterly unsurprising that the Executive Branch (specifically, 
the President and his political appointees at the DOJ) might have its own 
views about legal questions, including ones that do not directly implicate 
core areas of executive power. After all, regardless of whether one believes 
it is appropriate for the Executive Branch to act upon its own independent 
views of legal questions,162 it is not surprising that it should have such 
 
159  Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996). 
160  To be sure, some members of Congress who supported DOMA in 1996 might no longer support 
it in 2011. But whether that is the case or not, it is utterly unsurprising that the 112th Congress and 
President Obama may not want to defend this law. 
161  See infra notes 217‒28 and accompanying text. 
162  There is a substantial debate in the literature on that question. See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 15, 
at 406‒07 (“Now a growing number of respected constitutional theorists, coming from a broad range of 
political and jurisprudential perspectives, have begun to question the legitimacy of judicial supremacy in 
constitutional interpretation.”); Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in 
State and Federal Constitutional Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 656, 658 (2000) (“Even as judicial 
supremacy gains ascendancy in the courts, its star is on the decline in the legal academy.”); Frederick 
Schauer, Judicial Supremacy and the Modest Constitution, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1045, 1045 (2004) 
(“Judicial supremacy is under attack. From various points on the political spectrum, political actors as 
well as academics have challenged the idea that the courts in general, and the Supreme Court in 
particular, have a special and preeminent responsibility in interpreting and enforcing the Constitution.”). 
Compare, e.g., Lawson & Moore, supra note 71, at 1268 (“It is emphatically the province and duty of 
the President to say what the law is . . . .”), and Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: 
Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 222 (1994) (arguing that the President has 
the power “to interpret the law, including the Constitution, independently of the other branches’ 
interpretations”), with, e.g., Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional 
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1362 (1997) (“[W]e defend . . . [the] assertion of judicial 
primacy without qualification . . . .”), Burt Neuborne, The Binding Quality of Supreme Court Precedent, 
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views.163 And if it can (and should) have such views, it makes little sense to 
say that it cannot present those views to the courts. 
After all, even if one is not prepared to accept the idea that the 
Supreme Court’s claims of interpretive supremacy are merely “self-
interested assertion[s]” inconsistent with “constitutional first principles,”164 
and thinks instead that the Executive Branch is obliged “to comply with the 
law as judicially declared,”165 that does not mean the Executive Branch 
should suppress its views when the Court is deciding what the law is.166 
Indeed, it may actually facilitate judicial resolution of the issues for the 
Executive Branch to present the courts with its own best views of the legal 
question at issue. 
 
 * * * 
 
Thus, in the end, I do not think it is correct to cast the Executive 
Branch as Congress’s agent in this context and to argue that it must always 
defend challenged statutes for that reason. But, again, the fact that the 
Executive Branch need not defend challenged statutes does not mean that it 
should not. After all, even in the absence of a legal obligation, it may make 
sense for the Executive Branch to generally assume responsibility for 
defending challenged statutes. But it does mean that there may be 
circumstances in which it does not make sense for the Executive Branch to 
do so. In the next Part, I consider the context in which the Obama 
Administration declined to defend DOMA, and I argue that the Executive 
Branch should not defend challenged statutes where it believes the statute is 
unconstitutional or even has questions about its constitutionality. 
 
61 TUL. L. REV. 991, 993 (1987) (“[S]o long as the judicial precedent remains viable, the executive’s 
duty is to conform its conduct to the Supreme Court’s precedent, not merely as a matter of respect, 
prudence, expedience, or realpolitik, but as a matter of formal legal obligation.”), and Schauer, supra, at 
1046 (“I seek to . . . show that the judicial role labeled ‘judicial supremacy’ is the natural partner of 
constitutionalism itself.”). 
163  See, e.g., Owen Fiss, Between Supremacy and Exclusivity, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 187, 187 
(2007) (“Throughout history, the Supreme Court has been depicted as the final arbiter of the meaning of 
the Constitution. Such a view does not deny the role that the other branches of government or, for that 
matter, the general citizenry have in interpreting the Constitution. It only posits a priority for the 
interpretations of the judicial branch. The governing assumption is that where there are conflicting 
interpretations, the Court’s should prevail.”). 
164  Paulsen, supra note 162, at 225. 
165  Neuborne, supra note 162, at 993. 
166  See id. at 1002 (arguing that even though the Attorney General “is bound by law to conform to 
established Supreme Court precedent,” he is “free to seek to persuade the Supreme Court to change its 
mind by seeking reargument and presenting new cases for decision”). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 1238 
III. DEFENDING EXECUTIVE NONDEFENSE 
In his statement announcing that the DOJ would no longer defend 
DOMA, the Attorney General explained that “[t]he President has . . . 
concluded that Section 3 of DOMA, as applied to legally married same-sex 
couples, . . . is . . . unconstitutional,” and that “[g]iven that conclusion, the 
President has instructed the Department not to defend the statute in [such 
cases].”167 The Attorney General also stated that he “concur[red] in [the 
President’s] determination.”168 In this Part, I assume that the President or his 
political appointees in the DOJ have determined that the law at issue is 
unconstitutional or, at minimum, have genuine questions about its 
constitutionality. I do not consider the internal process by which the 
President or the Department have arrived at that conclusion or whether this 
is a determination in which the President should always be involved. 
Instead, I simply focus on the reasons why the Department should not act 
for the United States in such a context. 
A. The Adversary System 
A defining and distinctive feature of the American legal system is its 
commitment to an adversarial system of justice.169 Although this 
commitment may be imperfectly realized, it manifests in numerous 
practices and procedures that define the American justice system. Standing 
doctrine, for example, is routinely justified as a means of “ensur[ing] the 
proper adversarial presentation” of issues, a presentation that will facilitate 
the courts’ ability to adjudicate cases and will improve the quality of the 
courts’ decisions in the end.170 
Brian Goldman has explained that the adversarial system of justice 
serves four distinct functions: “accuracy, acceptability, neutrality, and the 
resolution of actual disputes.”171 It furthers accuracy by ensuring that the 
court has before it all of the relevant facts and legal precedents, and it 
 
167  Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of 
Representatives, supra note 8, at 5. 
168  Id. 
169  See, e.g., Frost, supra note 22, at 495 (“[T]he adversarial system itself is widely acknowledged 
to be a fundamental feature of the American adjudicatory process.”); William B. Rubenstein, A 
Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371, 371 (2001) (“The traditional premise of 
American civil adjudication is that ours is an adversary system: Litigation is a process by which an 
impartial arbiter resolves a dispute between private parties following an adversarial demonstration of 
privately developed facts and zealously presented legal arguments.”); see also Heather Elliott, The 
Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 470 (2008) (noting that standing doctrine is rooted in the 
notion that the parties’ adverseness “promote[s] better litigation”). 
170  Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. 
Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978) (invoking the courts’ interest in “assur[ing] that the most 
effective advocate of the rights at issue is present to champion them” in the context of prudential 
limitations on standing). 
171  Goldman, supra note 22, at 940. 
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promotes acceptability by “providing parties with procedural justice: 
control over their own cases and a fair opportunity to be heard.”172 
Neutrality follows from the fact that the parties maintain control over their 
own cases; because the parties are providing the court with the information 
it needs, the court does not become “too active a participant in the 
proceedings.”173 Finally, by confining themselves to the resolution of actual 
disputes, the courts ensure that they do not transgress established limits on 
the judicial role.174 
As a general matter, the Executive Branch’s participation in a case 
promotes the adversarial system of justice and the underlying goals the 
system is supposed to promote. After all, where the Executive Branch 
believes that the challenged law is constitutional, there will generally be no 
one better positioned to defend it. The Executive Branch’s lawyers have the 
skills and resources to zealously advocate in defense of the United States 
and its laws. They can provide the court with all of the information and law 
it will need to resolve the case, and they will often be particularly well 
positioned both to advise the court as to how the law works in practice and 
to determine which arguments will serve the nation’s short- and long-term 
interests. 
But for the reasons discussed above, there will be cases in which the 
Executive Branch does not actually believe the law is constitutional (or at 
least has questions about its constitutionality) and cases in which the 
Executive Branch’s ability to zealously defend the statute may be 
compromised.175 For example, where the Executive Branch believes a law is 
 
172  Id. at 943. 
173  Id. at 947 (quoting Stephan Landsman, The Decline of the Adversary System: How the Rhetoric 
of Swift and Certain Justice Has Affected Adjudication in American Courts, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 487, 491 
(1980)). 
174  See, e.g., Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 103 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (“We are 
not statesmen; we are judges.”); Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. Steamship Co. v. Comm’rs of Emigration, 113 
U.S. 33, 39 (1885) (“[The Court] has no jurisdiction to pronounce any statute, either of a State or of the 
United States, void, because irreconcilable with the Constitution, except as it is called upon to adjudge 
the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies. In the exercise of that jurisdiction, it is bound by two 
rules, [one of which is] . . . never to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the 
precise facts to which it is to be applied.”); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Injury and the Disintegration of Article 
III, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1915, 1920 (1986) (“It is a judge’s obligation to decide private disputes. If, as part 
of that process, interpretation of the constitutionality of statutes is required, so be it. The trigger of 
judicial power, however, is the protection of private rights.”). 
175  See Devins & Prakash, supra note 20, at 572 (“[A] law’s proponents are more likely to 
vigorously defend the statute than is the Solicitor General, who, in the course of a tepid defense of a law, 
might admit its constitutional infirmities.”). One commentator has argued that “[t]he Constitution itself 
provides sufficient means for Congress to encourage the executive to defend vigorously all federal 
statutes: the appropriations power, the impeachment power, the investigatory and oversight power, and 
the legislative power.” Cobb, supra note 78, at 233 (footnotes omitted). In theory, perhaps this is right; 
but in practice, it seems unlikely that Congress can effectively monitor the Executive Branch’s litigation. 
Moreover, this view seems to ignore the complications presented by modern political realities. See 
generally Levinson & Pildes, supra note 16, at 2315 (“The practical distinction between party-divided 
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unconstitutional, it may be unwilling to make the strongest arguments that 
can be made in its defense. After all, the Executive can—and often does—
have its own independent views of the Constitution,176 and those 
independent views may affect what arguments it is willing to make in its 
briefs.177 Indeed, the Executive Branch has long maintained that it will make 
only “reasonable” arguments in defense of a statute, and that not every 
“plausible” or “professionally responsible argument[]” is a “‘reasonable’ 
one.”178 As one long-time Senate staffer noted, this was a recurrent problem 
that contributed to the need for the Senate Legal Counsel: the DOJ “might 
not like the statute, and it might not defend it quite as vigorously as we 
would like, or it might use arguments that are not the same arguments we’d 
make.”179 And regardless of whether this was a frequent problem in the past, 
the modern prospect of the circulation of briefs on the Internet may make it 
more likely that the executive branch will be reticent to publicly take legal 
positions with which it disagrees.180 
In such cases, the Executive’s “defense” of a statute may actually 
undermine the interests of an adversarial system of justice more than it 
 
and party-unified government rivals in significance, and often dominates, the constitutional distinction 
between the branches in predicting and explaining interbranch political dynamics.”). 
176  See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 162, at 221 (“[T]he executive’s power to interpret the law may, 
and should, be exercised independently of the interpretations of other branches, including those of the 
federal courts.”). Paulsen and others have gone even farther to argue that the Executive’s determinations 
regarding which laws are unconstitutional should guide its enforcement decisions. See, e.g., id. at 
221‒22 (“[The President] may decline to execute acts of Congress on constitutional grounds, even if it is 
those grounds have been rejected by the courts. In executing a statute he determines is constitutionally 
valid, he may use his own interpretation of the statute, even if it is contrary to the interpretation placed 
on it by the courts.”); see also William Baude, Signing Unconstitutional Laws, 86 IND. L.J. 303, 307 
(2011) (“I share the increasingly conventional wisdom that the President must interpret the Constitution 
for himself, and must not enforce laws he believes violate it.”); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The 
Executive’s Duty to Disregard Unconstitutional Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 1613, 1616‒17 (2008) (“[The 
President] violates his constitutional oath when he enforces a law he regards as unconstitutional.”). 
177  There are other institutional actors that may also have interests independent of their client. The 
ACLU and the Washington Legal Foundation, for example, are ideological actors, and they presumably 
will hesitate before making arguments that win the battle but lose the war. Thus, their views and 
interests are going to influence the nature of the arguments that they make in court, which can raise 
interesting ethical questions. 
178  Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of 
Representatives, supra note 8, at 5. 
179  Interview with Charles Ludlam, Senate Historical Office Oral History Project, The Senate Legal 
Counsel: Interview #1, at 22 (Dec. 2, 2003) [hereinafter Ludlam Interview], available at http://
www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/Ludlam_Interview1.pdf. 
180  For example, when the Obama Administration’s early briefs in the DOMA litigation contained 
arguments that were reasonably understood to be anti-gay, a firestorm of controversy erupted. Cf. 
Richard Brust, Dead Precedents: The Justices Overrule, but They Often Do So Stealthily, A.B.A. J., 
May 2011, at 22, 23 (quoting Professor Paul Horwitz as saying, “In a media-heavy age, the court is so 
aware of being watched that it’s especially loath to act with what might be seen as a heavy hand.”). 
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promotes them.181 Where the Executive is unwilling to make all of the 
arguments that could be made in defense of a statute, the court will not 
receive a full presentation of the relevant issues and arguments, thus at least 
potentially undermining the accuracy of the system. And the court may 
have to engage in more independent research then it would otherwise find 
necessary, thereby undermining the system’s interest in preserving a neutral 
decision maker. 
The DOMA litigation provides an apt example of how the Executive 
Branch’s views regarding the constitutionality of a statute can influence its 
ability to defend it. After all, the Obama Administration abandoned 
arguments in defense of DOMA that had been made by the Bush 
Administration. The Bush Administration, for example, had argued that 
“section 3 of DOMA [is] rationally related to the legitimate government 
interest in encouraging the development of relationships that are optimal for 
procreation”182 and that “Congress may permissibly decide to encourage the 
creation of stable relationships that facilitate the rearing of children by both 
of their biological parents.”183 
One can strongly disagree with those arguments yet still recognize that 
they might be persuasive to certain judges.184 Once the Obama 
Administration abandoned those arguments, it was forced to make 
arguments that were at best weak and at worst incoherent: for example, that 
the legitimate governmental interest underlying DOMA was its interest in 
maintaining the status quo, a curious argument, given that the status quo 
prior to the enactment of DOMA simply recognized as valid any marriage 
conducted in a state that recognized it as valid. Moreover, while one might 
think that arguments about procreation would do little to promote the 
accuracy of the courts’ decisions regarding DOMA, one can easily imagine 
situations in which the Government’s failure to present the court with all of 
the relevant facts and law could undermine the accuracy of the court’s 
conclusion.185 
 
181  See Peter L. Strauss, The President and Choices Not to Enforce, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
107, 120 (2000) (“The integrity of the judicial process may be undercut when parties put forward for 
duty’s sake a position to which, in fact, they do not subscribe.”). 
182  Memorandum in Support of Fed. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 15, Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. 
Supp. 2d 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (No. 8:04-cv-1680-T-30TBM), 2004 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 
31640, at *27–28 (“Congress could seek to encourage the creation of stable relationships in which 
people can securely procreate.”). 
183  Id. at 16. 
184  See, e.g., Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 463 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). 
185  One could imagine, for example, a Republican administration agreeing to defend the health care 
legislation, but only on the basis of the taxing and spending power, thus leaving out of the statute’s 
defense critical empirical information that would buttress the statute’s validity under the Commerce 
Clause. Whether the court in such cases should appoint additional counsel to present or develop a 
particular argument is a difficult question. 
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To be sure, amici may step in and make some of the arguments that the 
Executive Branch declines to make. But amici will generally be unable to 
develop the factual record before the trial court, which means that the court 
will either decide the case based on an incomplete factual record or based 
on facts that have not been subjected to the rigors of adversarial testing. 
Moreover, amici will generally receive less attention than the parties, 
especially when the party is the United States as represented by executive 
branch lawyers. Finally, amici will have fewer pages of briefing and 
generally no opportunity to present their views to the court through oral 
argument. Thus, where the Executive Branch fails to zealously defend a 
statute, the zealousness of amici will generally be insufficient to address the 
problem. 
The Executive Branch’s failure to zealously defend a statute can also 
undermine the general public’s willingness to accept the court’s decision. 
When Goldman wrote that the adversarial system improves the 
acceptability of decisions, he focused primarily on the parties’ acceptance 
of a court’s decision,186 but the public’s acceptance is also important, 
especially where the significance of the case will extend far beyond the 
immediate parties. If the public perceives that the Executive Branch did not 
mount a full defense of the statute, it may undermine the public’s 
confidence in a decision striking it down. It is not difficult to imagine that 
this would have happened if the Obama Administration had continued its 
defense of DOMA, as commentators were already criticizing the 
Administration for mounting a “deliberately weak legal defense” of the 
statute.187 Here, too, the advent of the Internet and the wider distribution of 
government briefs may contribute to a decline in the acceptance of court 
decisions where it is perceived that the government failed to mount a full 
defense of the statute. 
There is thus reason to think that the Executive Branch’s defense of a 
statute may undermine adversarialism more than it promotes it in cases 
where the Executive Branch has questions about the law’s constitutionality. 
To be sure, private attorneys often take positions with which they disagree 
and argue for laws which they may think are unconstitutional. And there is 
no doubt that executive branch lawyers could do the same. But, as I argue 
in the remainder of this Part, the Executive Branch is different than private 
counsel. Although private counsel’s primary interest is in victory for their 
clients,188 the Executive Branch has its own institutional interests, and it 
 
186  See Goldman, supra note 22, at 943‒47. 
187  “Deliberately Weak Legal Defense,” CAL. CATHOLIC DAILY (July 12, 2010), http://calcatholic.
web141.discountasp.net/news/newsArticle.aspx?id=14f12763-f31f-43be-89ea-9ea2de53948a. 
188  All lawyers, of course, have some duty to the court, but their primary duty is to zealously 
advocate on behalf of their client. Cf. James A. Cohen, Lawyer Role, Agency Law, and the 
Characterization “Officer of the Court,” 48 BUFF. L. REV. 349, 350 (2000) (“[I]n our adversary system 
the lawyer’s duty to the court is almost entirely harmonious with the lawyer’s duty as agent for her 
client.”). 
106:1201  (2012) Defending Executive Nondefense 
 1243
should not be forced to take legal positions contrary to those interests. 
Doing so may undermine both the Executive Branch’s own interests and its 
relationship with the courts. 
B. The Executive’s Independent Interests 
As discussed above, the Executive Branch has—and should have—its 
own legal views, and those views will sometimes be distinct from those 
views that should be advanced to zealously defend a challenged statute.189 In 
some cases, the Executive Branch’s interests are institutional; indeed, it is 
in the context of such cases that the Executive, recognizing its own conflict 
of interest, has historically been particularly likely to decline to exercise its 
duty to defend. In many other cases, the Executive’s interest is not 
institutional; the Executive Branch simply has a view on a legal question 
which is contrary to the defense of the statute. Whether institutional or not, 
the Executive Branch should be able to articulate its own best view of the 
law not only to influence the courts, but also to make its view of the law 
clear to the general public. 
After all, the role of government lawyers may be to influence judges, 
not the general public,190 but the general public nevertheless pays attention 
when the Executive Branch speaks—probably more so now than ever 
before. And when the Executive Branch speaks in court, it may be 
technically representing the United States, but realistically (and reasonably), 
the public is often going to assume that the views the Executive Branch is 
expressing are its own.191 This means not only that the Executive Branch 
 
189  See, e.g., Devins & Prakash, supra note 20, at 526‒32 (discussing the President’s “interpretive 
independence” in the context of analyzing the duty to defend); Miller & Bowman, supra note 62, at 65 
(“Although the President undoubtedly represents the United States in certain constitutionally delineated 
areas, this does not establish that the interests of the two entities are interchangeable.”). From this 
premise, Miller and Bowman reach an arguably surprising conclusion. In their view, “‘the United States’ 
is a single entity with multiple heads,” and “perceiving ‘the United States’ as a single entity makes the 
propriety of the Justice Department judicially challenging an act of Congress dubious at best.” Id. at 70, 
72. I take the opposite view: because the “United States” is composed of many competing parts, it will 
not always make sense for only one part to act on behalf of the whole. 
190  See Lee, supra note 59, at 600 (“The audience for [the Solicitor General’s] briefs and arguments 
consists of nine people and nine people only. To the extent that his efforts to persuade those nine people 
also yield some other benefits, that is fine, but that is not his job. Public relations and mass 
communications are not what he was trained for and not what he does well.”). 
191  This explains, for example, why the Obama Administration was criticized so vehemently for 
arguments in an early DOMA filing that were viewed as anti-gay. See, e.g., John Aravosis, Obama 
Defends DOMA in Federal Court. Says Banning Gay Marriage Is Good for the Federal Budget. Invokes 
Incest and Marrying Children, AMERICABLOG (June 12, 2009, 9:44 AM), http://
www.americablog.com/2009/06/obama-justice-department-defends-doma.html (describing the brief as 
“despicable, and gratuitously homophobic”); Kerry Eleveld, Obama and DOMA: The Unspoken Truth 
and How We Got Here, EQUALITY MATTERS (Feb. 24, 2011, 2:59 PM), http://equalitymatters.org/blog/
201102240011 (“[N]early every major LGBT organization eventually denounced the brief . . . .”); Deb 
Price, Gays Feel Short-Changed by Obama, CREATORS.COM, http://www.creators.com/liberal/deb-price/
gays-feel-short-changed-by-obama.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2012) (describing “Gay Americans” as 
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may be held accountable for views it does not hold but also that those views 
may in fact be granted greater legitimacy because they are associated with 
the President. In other words, forcing the Executive Branch to make 
arguments in which it does not believe—or prohibiting it from making 
affirmative arguments in which it does—hurts the President’s ability to 
effectively use his office as a bully pulpit. 
It is again worth noting that I do not take the position that the 
Executive Branch should (or necessarily even can) decline to defend 
statutes solely because it disagrees with them as a matter of policy. But the 
President is just as entitled to share his views on questions of law as he is 
on questions of policy.192 And on significant legal questions—such as the 
constitutionality of laws that discriminate on the basis of sexual 
orientation—the President may well want to share his views with the 
general public, in part because of the possibility that the general public’s 
views might in turn be shaped by the President’s. 
Indeed, in cases where the Executive Branch believes that a law is 
unconstitutional, nondefense provides a means of expressing such 
opposition that is arguably less problematic than nonenforcement. As I 
noted above, there are arguments that the Executive can—and even 
should—decline to enforce laws that it deems unconstitutional.193 While the 
arguments about nonenforcement are beyond the scope of this Article, it 
does seem that there is (at minimum) something more troubling about 
nonenforcement than nondefense. Because the Executive Branch’s authority 
to enforce statutes is, in many respects, exclusive, the Executive Branch’s 
decision not to enforce a statute effectively invalidates the law (at least 
during the period of nonenforcement), in contravention of the Executive’s 
proper role in our constitutional system.194 Equally troubling, it can often 
(although not always) undermine the possibility of judicial review.195 
 
“infuriated and dismayed by a pair of shockingly anti-gay legal briefs filed by President Barack 
Obama’s Justice Department”). 
192  See Walter Dellinger, The DOMA Decision, NEW REPUBLIC (Mar. 1, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://
www.tnr.com/article/politics/84353/gay-marriage-obama-gingrich-doma?page=0,1 (“I don’t believe that 
any administration is obliged to urge a court to accept propositions that the president believes are 
fundamentally wrong . . . .”). 
193  See supra Parts II, III. 
194  See, e.g., Lear Siegler, Inc., Energy Prods. Div. v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102, 1124 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(“To construe this duty to faithfully execute the laws as implying the power to forbid their execution 
perverts the clear language of the ‘take care’ clause: ‘To “execute” a statute . . . emphatically does not 
mean to kill it.’” (quoting Miller, supra note 76, at 398)). 
195  See id. at 1125 (“We also note that in declaring the CICA stay provisions unconstitutional and 
suspending their operation, the executive branch has assumed a role reserved for the judicial branch. It 
hardly need be repeated that ‘it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say 
what the law is.’ . . . The executive branch’s attempt to arrogate to itself the power of judicial review is a 
paradigmatic violation of our system of separation of powers and checks and balances.” (quoting 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803))). 
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C. The Executive and the Courts 
The Executive Branch’s ability to provide the courts with its own best 
view of the law, irrespective of the effect such a view will have in a 
particular case, also contributes (in part) to the Executive Branch’s special 
relationship with the courts.196 Whatever obligations government lawyers 
may have to their client, the United States, they also “have an obligation to 
see to it that justice is done.”197 This special obligation carries with it both 
responsibilities and rewards: the responsibility to temper zealous advocacy 
with a commitment to the right outcome and the concomitant reward of 
special respect from the courts. The special relationship between 
government lawyers and the courts in which they appear is perhaps most 
evident in the relationship between the Solicitor General and the Supreme 
Court. Often heralded as the “tenth justice,” the Solicitor General enjoys a 
special relationship with the Court and has a “special duty” toward it.198 One 
former Solicitor General has explained that this special duty results in 
“advocacy which is more objective, more dispassionate, more competent, 
and more respectful of the Court as an institution than it gets from any other 
lawyer,”199 even if that approach sometimes undermines the defense of 
federal statutes.200 
As former Solicitor General Robert Bork explained in a letter 
defending the Solicitor General’s decision in Buckley to file two briefs 
taking different positions, “The standing of the Department and the 
Solicitor General before the Supreme Court . . . rests . . . upon a sense of 
obligation to the Court and to the constitutional system so that we often 
 
196  There is no single explanation for the special esteem in which government lawyers are generally 
held by the courts, and the quality of their work is surely an important factor in the way they are viewed. 
See, e.g., Fraley, supra note 19, at 1267 (“[I]t is recognized that the work product of the Solicitor 
General’s office is unparalleled.”). 
197  W. Bradley Wendel, Government Lawyers, Democracy, and the Rule of Law, 77 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1333, 1349 (2009) (“Courts similarly state that government lawyers have an obligation to see to it 
that justice is done, not simply to maximize the likelihood that the client’s interests will be achieved.”); 
see also Lee, supra note 59, at 595‒96 (“[There are] three distinct ways in which the government lawyer 
as a litigator has an enhanced responsibility as an officer of the court . . . .”). 
198  Cordray & Cordray, supra note 42, at 1361. To be sure, there are competing conceptions of the 
role of the Solicitor General, but fundamental to any view of the Solicitor General is his special 
relationship with the Court. See, e.g., id. (“(1) the Solicitor General as ‘tenth justice’; (2) the Solicitor 
General as advocate for the federal government as an institution; and (3) the Solicitor General as 
advocate of the President’s administration.”); William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as 
a Three-Branch Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 831, 878 (2001) (“A large body of literature analyzes the 
proper role of the Solicitor General in developing the legal positions of the executive branch . . . . Some 
have claimed that the Solicitor General’s role is to serve the interests of the Court, as a sort of super-
advisor on the correct answer to legal questions; others stress that the Solicitor General’s job is to 
advocate (within reasonable limits) the legal positions of the executive branch in the Supreme Court.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
199  Lee, supra note 59, at 597. 
200  See Days, supra note 27, at 488. 
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behave less like pure advocates than do lawyers for private interests.”201 
Allowing Executive Branch lawyers “to present the issues in the round,”202 
that is, to attempt to present both sides of an argument, facilitates the 
Executive Branch’s ability to help the courts reach the proper outcome.203 
If government lawyers forsake this obligation and fail to present the 
courts with their best view of the law, those actions can undercut the special 
esteem in which they are generally held. This in turn damages not only the 
Executive Branch, but also the United States because that special respect, 
borne out of both the special integrity of government lawyers and the 
quality of their advocacy, surely contributes to the success that the 
government generally enjoys in litigation.204 
To be sure, if the Executive Branch were to begin abandoning the 
defense of statutes simply because it disagreed with them as a matter of 
policy—and not because it had legitimate questions about their legality—
that could also damage the reputation of government lawyers, who are 
supposed to be influenced by the law, not by politics.205 But where the 
Executive Branch has real questions about the legality of a statute—
separate and apart from its views regarding the politics and policy of the 
underlying statute—the Executive Branch is not playing politics when it 
articulates those views to the courts. It is simply presenting the courts with 
its best understanding of the law. And the courts can then trust that the 
Executive is committed to presenting its best view of the law—both in 
cases where it agrees with the statute as a matter of policy and in cases 
where it does not. 
 
201  Buckley Hearings, supra note 60, at 500. 
202  Id. at 501. 
203  See id. (“[I]n a matter of this significance, a case of perhaps the greatest constitutional 
significance of this century, it seems to me entirely appropriate that the Court have before it whatever 
we can add.”). 
204  See Lee, supra note 59, at 597 (noting that the Solicitor General must use her power carefully, 
“lest the reservoir of credibility which is the source of this special advantage be diminished, with 
adverse consequences not only to the government’s ability to win cases, but also to an important 
institution of government itself”). 
205  See, e.g., Paul D. Clement, The Intra-Executive Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 311, 317 
(2009) (noting the “temptation” in the Solicitor General’s office to change positions following an 
election, but arguing that some changes can “come[] at a great cost to the credibility of the Solicitor 
General and the Office of the Solicitor General before the Court”); Meltzer, supra note 72, at 1214 
(expressing the concern that an administration’s decision to “reverse course [in defending a statute] will 
inevitably lead to a charge that the incumbent administration is picking and choosing whether to defend 
statutes based on its policy preferences”). Of course, the two are not wholly unrelated. Whether one 
thinks that the health care reform law is unconstitutional may turn in part on one’s understandings about 
the effect of the uninsured on the rest of the health care market, and whether one thinks DOMA is 
constitutional may turn on one’s views about the validity of the potential government interests 
underlying the statute. 
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IV. AN ALTERNATIVE DEFENSE 
If the Executive Branch should not defend a challenged statute where it 
has questions about its constitutionality, the critical question remains of 
what should happen. The Executive Branch could, of course, do what it did 
in Buckley, presenting the court with its own best view of the law as well as 
what it believes to be the strongest arguments in support of the statute. 
Although I think that approach has much to commend it, it has been only 
rarely adopted by the Executive Branch, and so I focus on those situations 
in which the Executive Branch declines to participate at all. In such a case, 
the absence of executive defense should not mean no defense because the 
statute’s constitutionality should ultimately be determined by the courts and 
with the assistance of zealous advocates on both sides. I consider first two 
alternatives to executive defense and then some objections to these 
proposed alternatives. 
A. Congress 
The first and most obvious alternative to executive defense is the one 
that has historically been most common and that was adopted in the case of 
DOMA: congressional defense. By statute, the Attorney General is required 
to “submit to the Congress a report of any instance in which the Attorney 
General or any officer of the Department of Justice . . . determines . . . to 
refrain (on the grounds that the provision is unconstitutional) from 
defending . . . the constitutionality of any provision of any Federal [law].”206 
That notification provides Congress with the opportunity to participate in 
litigation in defense of challenged statutes when the Executive declines to 
do so. Indeed, the Senate Legal Counsel was created, at least in part, in 
response to concerns that the Executive Branch was “failing to defend the 
constitutionality of some statute[s].”207 
 
206  28 U.S.C. § 530D(a)(1) (2006). 
207  See Ludlam Interview, supra note 179, at 21‒22 (noting that the Senate Legal Counsel was 
established, in part, because of one of its progenitor’s amazement at the fact that “the executive branch, 
which was supposedly responsible for taking care that the laws be faithfully executed, was failing to 
defend the constitutionality of some statute[s]”). More generally, the Senate Legal Counsel was a 
response to Watergate and the perceived need for some institution to represent Congress’s interests in 
court. See id. at 15. As a staffer principally responsible for the establishment of the Senate Legal 
Counsel has explained, prior to its establishment, “there was no office in the Congress that was handling 
this critical litigation function in defense of the separation of powers and checks and balances. . . . We 
had a badly flawed, ad hoc system, a patchwork system that left us mostly defenseless against attacks on 
our constitutional status.” Id.; see also Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice: Hearing on 
S. 2803 and S. 2978 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
93d Cong. 29 (1974) (statement of Sen. Vance Hartke) (“A counsel for the Congress would not be in the 
business of enforcing the law, but rather he would provide an authoritative interpretation of the laws on 
behalf of the institution of Congress rather than for the courts to rely solely upon the Justice Department 
or another party to the case.”). There is no joint counsel because at the time the Senate Legal Counsel 
was created, the House had an established system for dealing with litigation through its Clerk’s Office 
and thus had no interest in a joint counsel. See Ludlam Interview, supra note 179, at 24. 
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There are two principal legal objections to Congress’s participation in 
this way. First, one might object that it violates separation of powers 
principles because it permits Congress to participate in the execution of the 
laws.208 But for the reasons discussed above,209 I do not think that defending 
a law in court is the same as executing the law, and thus I do not think 
Congress’s involvement raises separation of powers concerns. Second, one 
might object that congressional participation in the defense of statutes raises 
the thorny problem of legislator standing.210 I do not think this is a real 
obstacle to congressional participation either. 
As an initial matter, when Congress defends a statute in the 
Executive’s stead, it is not acting for itself but instead for the United States. 
To put it somewhat differently, Congress is merely acting as the United 
States’ agent in the defense of the validly enacted law that is being 
challenged in court. Recognizing that there can be complications inherent in 
the Executive Branch acting as agent for the whole—and that sometimes it 
is not well-positioned to fulfill that role—simply means that sometimes it 
will be necessary to find another agent. Congress is a natural choice to fill 
that role. This is thus quite different than the typical context in which 
congressional standing is raised, that is, where individual members of 
Congress are challenging a law. 
In any event, even if congressional standing were the appropriate frame 
for thinking about congressional intervention in this context, such 
intervention is still meaningfully different than the paradigmatic situation in 
which individual legislators are challenging a law. In Raines v. Byrd, for 
example, the Supreme Court rejected the standing of six individual 
members of Congress who sued to challenge the constitutionality of the 
Line Item Veto Act, concluding that they have “alleged no injury to 
themselves as individuals.”211 “[T]he institutional injury they allege,” the 
Court concluded, “is wholly abstract and widely dispersed . . . , and their 
attempt to litigate this dispute at this time and in this form is contrary to 
historical experience.”212 But in rejecting standing in that case, the Court 
“attach[ed] some importance to the fact that appellees have not been 
authorized to represent their respective Houses of Congress in this action, 
and indeed both Houses actively oppose their suit.”213 
 
208  See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726‒27 (1986) (“To permit an officer controlled by 
Congress to execute the laws would be, in essence, to permit a congressional veto. Congress could 
simply remove, or threaten to remove, an officer for executing the laws in any fashion found to be 
unsatisfactory to Congress. This kind of congressional control over the execution of the laws, Chadha 
makes clear, is constitutionally impermissible.”). 
209  See supra notes 79‒86 and accompanying text. 
210  See Dessem, supra note 147, at 13 (“[T]he doctrine[] of congressional standing . . . remain[s], at 
best, in a state of confusion and uncertainty within the District of Columbia Circuit.”). 
211  521 U.S. 811, 829 (1997). 
212  Id. 
213  Id. 
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After all, whatever one thinks about whether individual legislators 
should have standing, the practice of the Legislature (or a branch of the 
Legislature) appearing in court to represent its own institutional interests 
seems far less troubling.214 In fact, the ability of Congress as an institution 
to participate in litigation has repeatedly been recognized, especially in 
cases where the Executive Branch has failed to defend the statute at issue. 
In INS v. Chadha, for example, the Court accepted with no hesitation the 
propriety of Congress’s participation, noting that “from the time of 
Congress’ formal intervention . . . concrete adverseness [was] beyond 
doubt.”215 To be sure, it may be necessary for Congress (acting as agent for 
the whole) to play a different and more active role in the litigation than it 
has traditionally played in litigation in the past. Traditionally, Congress’s 
intervention (whether as a party or an amici) has been limited to the courts 
of appeals or the Supreme Court; if Congress is to act for the United States 
in the defense of challenged statutes, it may sometimes (as in the case of the 
DOMA litigation) have to participate in the trial court and assist in the 
development of the factual record. But there is no reason why Congress’s 
lawyers should not be able to participate in that process. 
The most significant problem seems to me to be not a legal one but a 
practical one. The Senate Legal Counsel and the House General Counsel’s 
Office do not have the focused mission of the DOJ’s litigating components 
 
214  See, e.g., Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 84‒85 (1987) (White, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(“[W]e have now acknowledged that the New Jersey Legislature and its authorized representative have 
the authority to defend the constitutionality of a statute attacked in federal court. . . . It is also clear that 
because [the legislators] did not seek to intervene as individual legislators in a nonrepresentative 
capacity, we again leave for another day the issue whether individual legislators have standing to 
intervene and defend legislation for which they voted.”); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Brennan, 571 F. 
Supp. 2d 1105, 1126 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (rejecting legislator standing, but noting that “[n]either the Senate 
nor the House of Representatives as a whole is seeking to compel the submission of the Research Plan or 
the Scientific Assessment. Nor are the intervenor-applicants alleging they have been authorized to 
represent their respective Houses of Congress in this action”); Dessem, supra note 147, at 26 (“In 
situations where Congress suffers an institutional injury . . . a suit brought by Congress would not pose 
the same practical problems as do actions by individual Members of Congress.”). But see Barnes v. 
Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 44 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting) (arguing that congressional standing 
represents a “constitutional upheaval”); see also Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 313 F.3d 495, 497 (9th Cir. 
2002) (“Let it first be said that the issue is not whether the United States has standing to appear in 
support of the constitutionality of the statute in question. Nobody doubts that it does. . . . The question is 
whether the Senate, as a separate part of the government, has standing to intervene to support statutes on 
its own behalf, and not really as a representative of the United States itself.”). The Ninth Circuit did not 
explain why the Senate was allowed to appear in a series of cases that “directly (particularly) implicated 
the authority of Congress within our scheme of government” if it could not appear to represent its 
institutional interests. Id. at 498. In any event, it is unclear that even the Ninth Circuit under Newdow 
would object to the Senate representing the United States’ interests in the defense of a challenged 
statute. 
215  462 U.S. 919, 939 (1983). Admittedly, the Court made that point in its discussion of whether 
there was a “case or controversy,” but that Congress’s intervention occasioned no commentary suggests 
that the Court viewed it as unexceptional. 
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and thus may need additional resources to help them fulfill this role.216 
Indeed, if the DOJ started to more regularly refuse to defend federal 
statutes, it might be that Congress’s legal offices should receive additional 
funding and staffing so that they can hire lawyers who will be able to focus 
exclusively on this responsibility. After all, if the courts are going to rely on 
the adversarial system to help them determine the constitutionality of 
federal statutes, we want the adversary defending the statute to be able to 
provide the strongest defense possible. 
B. Appointed Counsel 
The existing scholarship on the executive duty to defend seems to 
assume that in the absence of executive defense, congressional defense is 
the only alternative. This assumption presumably rests on the premise that 
if the United States (as embodied in the Congress and the Executive) no 
longer wants to defend the statute, then there is no live controversy. But 
recognizing the possibility for temporal tensions between the United States’ 
component parts highlights the fallacy of this approach; by the time a 
particular statute is challenged, the Congress that enacted it may be gone, 
and the current Congress may or may not be any better positioned than the 
Executive to zealously defend it.217 In other words, recognizing that the 
current Congress and Executive are, in some cases, not themselves 
principals, but instead agents for the Congress and Executive that enacted a 
law in the past, helps explain why there must be alternatives to both 
executive and congressional defense. A United States law remains good law 
unless and until it is repealed, and thus it should be defended in court. 
After all, if the Congress and the Executive could choose not to defend 
a law and no one else could replace them, they would be able to do 
indirectly what they do not have the political will to do directly—that is, 
repeal the law. Allowing such an implicit repeal would undermine 
democratic accountability, especially given that congressional nondefense 
 
216  See Cobb, supra note 78, at 210 (“In addition to the authority to defend a federal statute, the 
SLC exercises other litigation-related responsibilities . . . includ[ing] bringing a civil action to enforce a 
subpoena issued by the Senate or one of its subparts, defending against a subpoena . . . , presenting 
amicus curiae arguments, representing the Senate or one of its committees in immunity proceedings, 
defending the Senate or one [o]f its subparts in a civil action . . . , and performing various advisory 
duties.” (footnotes omitted)). These offices are relatively recent innovations, responses to the need for 
offices capable of protecting congressional interests when the Executive Branch did not. See Days, 
supra note 27, at 501 (noting that historically, when “the Executive and Legislative Branches were 
irretrievably at loggerheads, Congress was forced to hire private counsel or even send one of its own 
members into court”). 
217  See Days, supra note 27, at 503 (identifying one instance in which Congress elected not to 
defend a statute after the DOJ notified Congress that it would not defend the statute); see also Meltzer, 
supra note 72, at 1211‒13 (noting that “congressional pinch-hitting will often not be a full substitute for 
defense by the executive” because whether Congress will defend a challenged statute “depend[s] upon 
the political vicissitudes of the moment”). 
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does not even require a majority vote by both bodies.218 Moreover, even if 
there were not accountability concerns, allowing the current Executive and 
Legislature to undo the work done by a previous Executive and Legislature 
simply by declaring that work unconstitutional undermines the fundamental 
role played by the judiciary in our constitutional order.219 Even if the 
Legislature and the Executive are entitled to their own independent views 
on the constitutionality of legislation, their views are not supposed to be the 
final ones. Rather, the courts should have the final opportunity to consider 
the constitutionality of legislation after full briefing by those who think the 
legislation is constitutional, as well as those who do not. Thus, there must 
be some mechanism for the defense of statutes in those situations where 
neither the current Executive nor the current Legislature supports the 
statute. 
Indeed, there are numerous examples in the past in which the Senate 
has declined to take action after being notified that the Executive would no 
longer defend a statute.220 And if the Obama Administration had decided not 
to defend DOMA when Democrats still controlled both houses of Congress, 
it is entirely possible that neither House of Congress would have elected to 
defend the statute. After all, the two Democratic members of the House 
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group voted against directing the House 
Counsel to defend the statute, and following that vote, House Minority 
Leader Nancy Pelosi sent the House Speaker a letter criticizing the decision 
and asking for an accounting of the costs of the House’s involvement in the 
litigation.221 
Thus, where neither branch is willing to defend the statute, the courts 
should appoint lawyers to do so. In such a case, the court-appointed counsel 
would represent the United States, just as the Executive Branch or Congress 
would have had they decided to defend the law.222 There is little reason to 
think that the court will not be able to find attorneys willing to fulfill that 
obligation, even when laws are unpopular. Moreover, there is some 
 
218  In the House, involvement in litigation is governed by the five-member Bipartisan Legal 
Advisory Group, not the body as a whole. In the Senate, intervention as an amicus is governed by the 
body as a whole, but the default is noninvolvement, so no majority vote is required for nondefense. See 
Amanda Frost, Congress in Court, 59 UCLA L. REV. 914, 943‒44 (2012). 
219  It could also undermine the uniformity of the law if several circuits struck down the law but then 
a subsequent president began to enforce the law in those circuits in which it had not been challenged. 
220  See Note, supra note 77, at 984. 
221  See Lochhead, supra note 54 (“The American people want Congress to be working on the 
creation of jobs and ensuring the continued progress of our economic recovery rather than involving 
itself unnecessarily in such costly and divisive litigation.” (quoting Letter from Rep. Nancy Pelosi to 
House Speaker John Boehner)). 
222  To be sure, there may be some awkwardness in the absence of an actual client capable of 
providing direction and guidance, but that is also essentially the case when the Executive Branch or 
Congress is involved. In those cases, as well, the client is the “United States,” but the United States 
cannot provide any specific guidance or direction. In all of these cases, counsel must simply provide 
what he or she believes to be the strongest legal arguments in support of the statute’s constitutionality. 
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precedent for this approach. As Brian Goldman has written about at length, 
the Supreme Court has made a practice of “tapp[ing] an attorney to support 
an undefended judgment below, or to take a specific position as an amicus”; 
by his measure, it has done so forty-three times since 1954.223 Goldman 
argues that although the Court has sometimes used this approach 
inappropriately, as a means of reaching out to decide issues that the parties 
did not present,224 it is often appropriate for the Court to do this, including 
when “the Court has reason to believe that an ongoing controversy exists 
notwithstanding a respondent’s failure to appear.”225 The alternative, 
Goldman explains, is for the Court to “hear a one-sided appeal.”226 To be 
sure, there is a difference between the Supreme Court appointing counsel to 
represent a position on appeal and a lower court appointing counsel to 
develop the record below, but the point remains that courts sometimes take 
more active control over cases to ensure that the relevant issues are 
adequately presented to the court for decision.227 
And if there is any case in which it is appropriate for the courts to take 
a more active role it is surely when there is a valid federal law which the 
current Congress and President are unwilling to defend. This is especially 
so if the President plans to continue to enforce the law; in such a case, there 
is a live controversy between the United States and the individuals who are 
subject to that law. The Supreme Court has recognized as much, noting that 
“[e]ven [where] the Government largely agreed with the opposing party on 
the merits of the controversy,” there could be “an adequate basis for 
jurisdiction in the fact that the Government intended to enforce the 
challenged law against that party.”228 Even if the President has announced 
 
223  Goldman, supra note 22, at 909. This practice may help prevent Article III problems that could 
arise if judicial decisions below were left undefended. Cf. United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 
U.S. 693, 703‒04 (1988) (“[T]he independent ability of the Judiciary to vindicate its authority might 
appear to be threatened: both [lower] courts would have agreed that the contemner had disobeyed an 
order of the court, but the Executive’s judgment to the contrary would threaten to undermine those 
judicial decisions. This threat, however, is inconsequential, for it is this Court . . . that must decide 
whether to exercise its discretion to review the judgment below, and it is well within this Court’s 
authority to appoint an amicus curiae to file briefs and present oral argument in support of that 
judgment.”). 
224  See Goldman, supra note 22, at 971 (arguing that in such cases the Court should “adopt a more 
minimalist approach,” either denying certiorari or vacating the decision below as moot and remanding to 
the lower courts). 
225  Id. at 970. 
226  Id. 
227  Although such active involvement by the court is arguably inconsistent with our adversarial 
system’s emphasis on judicial neutrality, it can facilitate other attributes of the adversarial system by 
ensuring that both sides of the issue are zealously represented. In the absence of such involvement by the 
court, the court will either confront a one-sided presentation of the issue or have to engage in 
independent research on its own. 
228  See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940 n.12 (1983) (discussing Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 
461 U.S. 574, 585 n.9 (1983)). 
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that he will not enforce the law, there is arguably still a live controversy if 
the President’s announcement permits him to change course or if a 
subsequent Executive might remain free to renew enforcement based on 
past conduct. In such circumstances, the fact that the United States’ 
traditional lawyers have abandoned the statute’s defense does not mean that 
its defense should be abandoned altogether. 
C. Objections 
As the objections to the Obama Administration’s DOMA decision 
make clear, the suggestion that the Executive Branch need not always act 
for the United States in court—and, in fact, sometimes should not—is not 
uncontroversial. Three objections seem especially likely. First, and most 
significantly, opponents might worry that this proposal makes it likely that 
the United States’ laws will not be adequately represented. Second, 
opponents might worry that this proposal will damage comity between the 
branches. Third, opponents might find something troubling in the United 
States’ representation by court-appointed private counsel.229 
These are legitimate concerns, but in my view ultimately unpersuasive. 
Indeed, whether we recognize it or not, the reality is the same: the 
Executive Branch is just one part of the “United States” and will not always 
be well-positioned to act as simple agent for the whole. Recognizing that 
fact does not create these comity and other concerns; rather, it helps address 
them by ensuring that where the Executive Branch is not positioned to act, 
someone else will. 
First, recognizing that the Executive Branch does not have a duty to 
defend challenged statutes does not leave United States statutes 
undefended. Rather, as I discussed above, recognizing that it does not 
always make sense for the Executive Branch to act as agent for the whole 
opens the door for others to do so. Whether that responsibility falls to 
Congress or to court-appointed counsel, someone will be tasked with 
presenting a zealous defense of the challenged statute. Indeed, because the 
Executive may not be well-positioned to defend the statute, allowing others 
to fill that role may actually result in a more robust defense of the 
challenged statute than would otherwise exist.230 
Second, former Solicitor General Drew Days has argued that the 
Executive Branch’s defense of statutes that are “not patently 
 
229  See Meltzer, supra note 72, at 1209‒20 (providing thoughtful discussion of other potential 
problems with executive nondefense, including the “range of considerations that support the practice of 
enforcing and defending acts of Congress that the executive branch believes to be misguided, offensive, 
and quite possibly unconstitutional—in which category I would place DOMA and Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell”). 
230  See Dellinger, supra note 192 (arguing that the Obama Administration’s decision not to defend 
means that “the judges will know to look elsewhere for the most all-out, no-holds-barred defense of the 
law in question”). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 1254 
unconstitutional but . . . probably unconstitutional” “fosters comity between 
the Executive and Legislative Branches.”231 This is certainly true to some 
degree, but it is important to consider the countervailing costs to the 
effectiveness of our adversarial system and to the ability of both the 
Executive Branch and Congress to articulate their own views of the legal 
question at issue. Indeed, as previously noted, the Executive and Legislative 
Branches will sometimes have different views on legal questions,232 and, as 
General Days himself points out, it will sometimes be the case that “an 
executive department and an independent regulatory agency are at odds as 
to what position should be taken in a Supreme Court case involving other 
parties.”233 If such disagreements are inevitable, it is not clear that it will 
always promote comity for the Executive Branch to suppress (or, at 
minimum, predominate over) the views of the Legislature or independent 
agencies. It would seem far better in some circumstances to recognize that 
the Executive Branch cannot always act for the whole and to allow many 
parties to offer their competing visions of what the Constitution allows and 
to let the courts make the final determination. 
Third, opponents might find something troubling about private 
attorneys defending the laws of the United States. Although the prospect of 
private counsel representing the United States may be unusual, it is hardly 
unprecedented.234 Private attorneys regularly represented governmental 
interests early in the country’s history, and, although less common today, 
they continue to play a role in the representation of the United States. In 
Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., for example, the Supreme 
Court recognized that “[p]rivate attorneys appointed to prosecute a criminal 
contempt action represent the United States.”235 Moreover, in qui tam 
 
231  Days, supra note 27, at 502. General Days is, of course, not alone in this view. See, e.g., Dawn 
E. Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism and Nonjudicial Interpretation: Who Determines 
Constitutional Meaning?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 126 (2004) (noting that “presidential 
practices,” such as “defend[ing] acts of Congress that in their view are unconstitutional, as long as a 
reasonable argument can be made in support of the law . . . reflect respect for the Court and Congress 
and are consistent with the general separation of powers”). 
232  See supra notes 147‒58 and accompanying text. 
233  Days, supra note 27, at 496. 
234  To be sure, there can sometimes be difficult questions about what actions must be taken by the 
United States, as opposed to private parties. See, e.g., Robertson v. United States ex rel. Watson, 130 S. 
Ct. 2184, 2185 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the court below that an action for 
criminal contempt in a congressionally created court may constitutionally be brought in the name and 
pursuant to the power of a private person because “[t]he terrifying force of the criminal justice system 
may only be brought to bear against an individual by society as a whole, through a prosecution brought 
on behalf of the government”). But again the defense of challenged statutes does not involve private 
parties acting for the United States as much as providing one view of what the United States’ interests 
are in a particular case. 
235  481 U.S. 787, 804 (1987) (“A private attorney appointed to prosecute a criminal contempt 
therefore certainly should be as disinterested as a public prosecutor who undertakes such a 
prosecution.”). 
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actions, a private party brings suit in the name of the government to 
represent its interests.236 Although the United States is not, strictly speaking, 
a “party” to such cases, it nonetheless is a “real party in interest,” and its 
interests are thus being represented by a private party.237 Finally, private 
attorneys have also been retained to represent both the Congress and the 
Judiciary on a number of occasions.238 
At the end of the day, the concerns about executive nondefense all 
reflect the very reasonable concern that the United States’ laws should be 
defended and defended well. The question is simply how best that can be 
accomplished. Recognizing that the Executive Branch may not always be 
able to serve as a simple agent for the whole suggests that the best interests 
of the United States do not always rest in executive defense. Often (and 
perhaps even ideally) they will, but where they do not, recognizing the 
validity of executive nondefense should harm neither the Executive nor the 
United States and should instead help both. It should ensure that the 
Executive Branch can represent its own interests and protect its own 
integrity before the courts and the public, and it should ensure that the laws 
of the United States are represented by those best positioned to do so. 
V. BEYOND “DUTY TO DEFEND” 
In this Article, I have focused on one context in which the assumption 
that the Executive Branch should always act as simple agent for the whole 
is, in my view, both well-established and wrong. And it is wrong because it 
fails to appreciate that the Executive Branch is no simple agent and that 
significant consequences can follow when a part of the United States acts 
for the much more complicated whole. But the issues I have discussed in 
the context of the Executive Branch’s so-called duty to defend are not 
limited to that context. To the contrary, they provide reason to think more 
broadly about what it means for the Executive Branch to act as agent for the 
whole. The notion that the growth of the administrative state poses a risk of 
“systematic departmental self-aggrandizement” is not new,239 but the growth 
 
236  See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2006) (“A person may bring a civil action for a violation of section 
3729 for the person and for the United States Government. The action shall be brought in the name of 
the Government.”). 
237  See United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 556 U.S. 928, 934 (2009). To be sure, 
the Supreme Court has concluded that a “court-appointed prosecutor who sought certiorari and briefed 
and argued the case without the authorization of the Solicitor General may not represent the United 
States,” United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693, 695 (1988), but the question would have 
been an entirely different one had the Solicitor General authorized the special prosecutor to represent the 
United States, as it presumably would in cases where it has waived its right to defend the statute, see id. 
at 698‒99. 
238  See Providence Journal, 485 U.S. at 712‒13 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (collecting cases). 
239  Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 
953 (2005); see also Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most 
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2317 (2006) (“[T]he risks of unchecked executive 
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of the administrative state is more symptom than cause. Inherent in our 
institutional design is the possibility for divergence between those who 
make the law and those who execute it, as well as the merger of lawmaking 
and law-executing functions in a single branch. Even if checks and balances 
were supposed to counteract such risks, they have clearly proven 
insufficient in practice.240 
There are many contexts in which the Executive Branch purportedly 
acts on behalf of the United States, even though other parts of the United 
States have a role to play in determining the United States’ substantive 
policy positions, and even though there may be significant disagreement 
about how the United States should carry out those substantive policy 
goals.241 In many of these cases, the Executive Branch will be in some sense 
both principal and agent; it will have responsibility for substantive 
policymaking, but it will also be acting to effectuate policy goals reached in 
part by other components of the government.242 
 
power have grown to the point where dispatch has become a worn-out excuse for capricious activity.”); 
Jonathan Macey, Executive Branch Usurpation of Power: Corporations and Capital Markets, 115 YALE 
L.J. 2416, 2418 (2006) (“The ascendancy of the executive branch in policymaking is an unintended 
consequence of the modern administrative state. The emergence of the executive branch as the fulcrum 
of power within the administrative state represents a deviation from the traditional balance of powers 
among the three branches of government.”). 
240  See, e.g., James A. Gardner, Democracy Without a Net? Separation of Powers and the Idea of 
Self-Sustaining Constitutional Constraints on Undemocratic Behavior, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 293, 308 
(2005) (“And why have political actors not only failed to resist incursions on their power, but frequently 
acquiesced in a diminution of their own authority? Government officers seemingly had at their disposal 
all the tools necessary to fight off depredations committed by other branches, yet they chose to 
cooperate rather than to resist.”); Katyal, supra note 239, at 2320 (“In most instances today, the only 
way for Congress to disapprove of a presidential decree, even one chock full of rampant lawmaking, is 
to pass a bill with a solid enough majority to override a presidential veto.”); Levinson & Pildes, supra 
note 16, at 2313 (“Few aspects of the founding generation’s political theory are now more clearly 
anachronistic than their vision of legislative-executive separation of powers.”). 
241  The examples are numerous, if not endless. For example, the Executive Branch generally acts 
for the United States in its relations with other countries (both peaceful and otherwise), even though 
Congress also has a substantial role to play in determining the nation’s substantive policy in that area 
through, for example, its power to declare war and to regulate commerce with foreign nations. The 
Executive Branch also, as noted earlier, has exclusive responsibility for enforcing the nation’s laws, 
even though Congress clearly has a significant role to play in determining what those laws are. Although 
the contexts in which this issue arises are numerous, each one is unique—both in terms of the respective 
responsibilities of the branches and the amount of discretion the Executive Branch is supposed to have 
in its actions on behalf of the whole. 
242  The Executive Branch’s role as agent for the whole is even more complicated when independent 
agencies are involved. In such cases, the agency may not require legislative appropriations for its 
financing, its top officials may be free from presidential control, and significant portions of the staff may 
be appointed independently of both the President and Congress. These independent agencies can 
nonetheless wield considerable power. The Chairman of the Federal Reserve, for example, has been 
described as “the nation’s most powerful economic policymaking job.” Michael D. Shear & Neil Irwin, 
Bernanke to Be Reappointed as Fed Chairman, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2009, at A1. 
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This duality of the Executive Branch’s role creates the possibility that 
the Executive Branch will expand its own powers by purporting to act for 
the United States even when it has no authority to do so.243 When 
administrative agencies are acting for the United States to determine what 
its laws mean (and how they should be enforced), an administrative 
agency’s views may vary from what Congress intended when it enacted the 
law.244 Or when the Executive Branch is acting for the United States in 
hearings before the World Trade Organization and commits the United 
States to take certain trade-related actions, the Executive Branch may take a 
position with which Congress (which also has a role to play in regulating 
our trade with foreign nations245) disagrees. 
This possibility for unauthorized executive branch action raises serious 
accountability and legitimacy concerns. For example, if the Executive 
Branch takes some action abroad, it will generally be viewed as the action 
of the United States—and the United States will be held accountable—
regardless of whether any other part of the United States supported the 
action. There may also be questions about the legitimacy of the Executive 
Branch’s action if it did not enjoy the support of the Legislature or at least 
did not follow the proper processes before acting. Consider, for example, 
the recent military actions in Libya.246 The fact that the President acted 
without congressional consent did not make it any less the action of the 
United States in the eyes of the world. The President’s action may or may 
not have been lawful—there was apparently disagreement within the 
 
243  Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan?: Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 
91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 212 (1992) (“[T]he Take Care Clause confers a duty insofar as it imposes on the 
President both a responsibility to be faithful to law and an obligation to enforce the law as it has been 
enacted, rather than as he would have wished it to be.”). 
244  Or the administrative agency’s views may have changed over time. Or different administrative 
agencies will have different views regarding what the law means. The possible complications are many. 
See Rodriguez, supra note 19, at 1199–1200 (“[T]he President, through various control devices . . . [can] 
use[] his office to interpose himself between legislators’ preferences as reflected in their directions to 
administrators as well as the preferences of the administrators themselves.”). To be sure, agencies will, 
at least in theory, have to justify their regulation with reference to the underlying statute, but broad 
statutory language will often give agencies wide scope to implement the Executive Branch’s policy 
preferences. 
245  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (giving Congress the power to “regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations”). 
246  In 2011, civil war erupted in Libya between supporters of Muammar el-Qaddafi and those trying 
to overthrow his government, see, e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick & Mona El-Naggar, Son of Qaddafi Says 
Libya Faces Civil War Peril, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2011, at A1, and controversy erupted in Washington, 
D.C. over how, if at all, the United States should respond, see, e.g., David E. Sanger & Thom Shanker, 
Discord Grows on the Politics of Intervention, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2011, at A1. President Obama 
ultimately decided that the United States should intervene in the conflict. See, e.g., David E. Sanger, 
Possible Libya Stalemate Puts Stress on U.S. Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2011, at A8. 
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Executive Branch on that very question247—but regardless of its legality, its 
significance as an action of the United States is beyond dispute. 
In theory, at least, there are checks on unauthorized executive branch 
action. For example, the nondelegation doctrine requires Congress to 
include guiding principles when it delegates power to administrative 
agencies so that there is some limitation on their power to act.248 But even if 
the nondelegation doctrine were not essentially a dead letter,249 this check 
provides no recourse if the Executive Branch chooses to disregard a 
limitation contained in the statute. And although there will sometimes be 
opportunities for parties to challenge an executive branch action that is in 
tension with a statutory requirement, various justiciability doctrines, which 
limit which parties may bring claims in court and what kind of claims they 
may bring, mean that just as often there will not be such an opportunity.250 
For example, if the Executive Branch initiates military action, there may be 
statutes that purport to limit the Executive Branch’s authority in the absence 
of congressional consent. But that theoretical check is often meaningless 
because, as the prior discussion of political question doctrine revealed, 
courts will decline to intervene in such a dispute between the Executive 
Branch and Congress.251 
Thus, there may be many cases in which existing processes are 
insufficient to ensure that, when the Executive Branch is purporting to act 
as agent for the United States, it truly is, or in which we improperly assume 
 
247  See Charlie Savage, 2 Top Lawyers Lose Argument on War Powers, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2011, 
at A1. 
248  See, e.g., J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). 
249  See, e.g., Patrick M. Garry, The Unannounced Revolution: How the Court Has Indirectly 
Effected a Shift in the Separation of Powers, 57 ALA. L. REV. 689, 703 (2006) (“Various scholars have 
declared the Non-Delegation Doctrine, which was first announced by the Supreme Court in Field v. 
Clark, to be dead.” (footnote omitted)). 
250  See, e.g., Katyal, supra note 239, at 2321 (“[T]he executive branch has gained power from 
deference doctrines that induce courts to leave much conduct untouched . . . .”); William P. Marshall, 
Eleven Reasons Why Presidential Power Inevitably Expands and Why It Matters, 88 B.U. L. REV. 505, 
511 (2008) (“Because of justiciability limitations, many of the questions surrounding the scope of 
presidential power, such as war powers, never reach the courts.” (footnote omitted)); cf. Richard J. 
Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as a Judicially Imposed Limit on Legislative 
Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170, 1200 (1993) (noting that the reasoning in the majority opinion in Lujan 
“reallocates power among the institutions of government in three related ways,” including by 
“confer[ring] on agencies discretion to ignore many congressional policy decisions”). 
251  See supra notes 91‒93 and accompanying text; see also El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United 
States, 607 F.3d 836, 857 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Applying the 
political question doctrine in statutory cases thus would not reflect benign deference to the political 
branches. Rather, that approach would systematically favor the Executive Branch over the Legislative 
Branch—without the courts’ acknowledging as much or grappling with the critical separation of powers 
and Article II issues.”). Unsurprisingly, the Obama Administration has argued that a suit filed by 
members of Congress challenging the United States’ actions in Libya should be dismissed on political 
question grounds. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 13‒21, Kucinich v. 
Obama, No. 1:11-cv-01096 (RBW) (D.D.C. Aug. 19, 2011). 
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that the Executive Branch alone must be the United States’ exclusive agent. 
And this is because our failure to appreciate the complexities of the 
principal–agent problem in the context of executive branch action leads us 
to assume that it is always unproblematic for the Executive Branch to act as 
agent for the whole. In the duty-to-defend context, I have argued that the 
Executive Branch need not always be the United States’ exclusive agent, 
and, in fact, it is better for both the Executive Branch and the United States 
if others represent the United States when the Executive Branch has 
questions about the statute’s constitutionality. 
In other cases, it may be that the Executive Branch should act for the 
United States because unity of action is necessary, but we need more robust 
means of ensuring that the Executive Branch is truly acting for the United 
States and not just for itself. To be sure, there will not always be consensus 
among the United States’ competing parts as to any particular substantive 
policy goal. But there should be consensus—or at a minimum established 
rules—for determining which part (or parts) should have a role in 
determining what those substantive policy goals are and what actions the 
Executive Branch should take to advance them. And there should also be 
some means of ensuring that those rules are followed. For example, it may 
be that recognizing these complexities provides reason to rethink 
justiciability doctrines, such as political question doctrine, that limit the 
ability of the courts to consider congressional challenges to executive 
branch action. Or it may be that there are certain contexts in which the 
Executive Branch should not be allowed to act in the absence of prior 
congressional approval. 
Determining all of the various complications of the principal–agent 
problem in this context—and determining how those complications are best 
addressed—is beyond the scope of this Article. My point here is simply to 
point out that the issues I discussed in the context of the Executive Branch’s 
duty to defend challenged statutes have implications that extend well 
beyond that specific context. Although recognizing the complications that 
can arise when one part of the United States acts on behalf of the whole 
does not tell us how to deal with those complications—indeed, differences 
across contexts make any facile answer impossible—recognizing the 
existence of those complications is nonetheless an important first step. We 
cannot begin to address the problem until we recognize that it exists. 
CONCLUSION 
As attractive as the picture of the Executive Branch as a simple agent 
may be, that idea is belied by a much more complicated reality, a reality of 
multiple principals with different, at times mutually exclusive, interests and 
an agent that is at once both principal and agent. This insight provides new 
ways of thinking about executive branch action and suggests that it may not 
always be possible for one part of the United States to act 
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unproblematically for the whole. That insight may not tell us when it is 
appropriate for one part to act on behalf of the whole—or what checks are 
necessary to ensure that the part is acting in an authorized manner—but it 
does at least ensure that we are recognizing the potential problem and 
searching for context-specific ways to solve it. 
In this Article, I have focused on one particular context in which the 
view that the Executive Branch always can—and should—act as agent for 
the whole is well-entrenched and, in my view, wrong: the Executive 
Branch’s so-called duty to defend challenged statutes. I have argued that the 
Executive Branch should not defend a challenged statute where it has 
questions about the statute’s constitutionality. By recognizing that the 
United States has many constituent parts that at times have conflicting 
interests, it becomes clear that the United States and the Executive Branch 
are not one and the same and that sometimes the interests of both are better 
served by executive nondefense, rather than defense. By recognizing that, 
we can ensure that whatever entity represents the United States in court is 
truly representing the United States’ interests and not merely its own. 
 
